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FOREVER EVERGREEN: AMENDING THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION FOR A
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
Devra R. Cohen
Abstract: Pollution poses an ongoing threat to the health and welfare of the citizens of
Washington State. Air pollution costs Washington approximately $190 million per year,
ocean acidification is contributing to oyster die-offs, and approximately 677,000 acres of
land are affected by area-wide soil contamination. Although Washington has aspirational
environmental legislation and a narrowly defined duty under article XVII of the Washington
State Constitution to protect navigable waters, their shores and tidelands, the State needs to
do more if its citizens—present and future—are going to enjoy a healthy environment.
Amending the Washington State Constitution to include an extended public trust doctrine
that provides broad environmental protection and incorporates an affirmative right to a
healthy environment will add a layer of environmental protection and provide the impetus for
politically difficult environmental action. Amending the State Constitution to include a
positive right to a healthy environment would not be a radical departure from current policy,
and is necessary to safeguard the environment for present and future generations.

INTRODUCTION
Washington State, along with the rest of the world, is facing and will
continue to face significant environmental challenges. Air pollution, soil
pollution, and climate change all pose serious threats to the state’s
natural environment, economy, and citizens’ health. To tackle these
threats, this Comment argues for an amendment to the Washington State
Constitution that enshrines a broad public trust duty and provides a
positive right 1 to a healthy environment. To protect Washingtonians’
health and welfare, and to ensure a healthy environment for generations
to come, the Washington State Constitution should be amended to
include the following provision:
(a) The state of Washington is the trustee of Washington’s
natural environment, including the air, water, soil, and ocean
shores. It is one of the principal duties of the state to protect,
1. A “positive right” is “[a] right entitling a person to have another do some act for the benefit of
the person entitled.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (10th ed. 2014). As one scholar explained, in
the context of state constitutions, “‘positive’ rights provisions or broad normative goals and
aspirations . . . require, rather than prohibit, government action.” Cornell W. Clayton, Toward a
Theory of the Washington Constitution, 37 GONZAGA L. REV. 41, 75 (2001–2002) (emphasis in
original). Positive rights enshrined in state constitutions “impose an obligation on state governments
to act.” Id.
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preserve, and restore the state’s natural environment for the
current generation and for generations to come. Those residing
within Washington’s borders, now and in the future, have a
positive right to live in and enjoy a healthy environment.
(b) This amendment shall take full effect immediately upon the
approval and ratification by the qualified voters. The legislature
may take action to carry out the purposes of this section, but no
such action shall be required for this section to become
effective. 2
This language provides a positive right to a healthy environment. Like
the right to education, 3 this proposed language would allow citizens to
sue the government 4 to declare and enforce their rights, 5 and would
encourage both the legislature and the courts to prioritize environmental
protection. 6 The provision is meant to encompass all aspects of the
natural environment—including those, like air and water, that are
affected by climate change—and enshrine a broad public trust duty in
the State Constitution. 7 Although adding such an amendment may seem
2. A proposed joint resolution to introduce this amendment is attached as Appendix A.
3. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account
of race, color, caste, or sex.”).
4. Individuals can bring constitutional challenges. See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d
447, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (enforcing the right to amply funded education found in article IX, section
1 of the Washington State Constitution). Even if sovereign immunity were to be an issue, the
legislature could waive that immunity, as it has in the tort context. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.92.090 (2014) (“The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary
capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it
were a private person or corporation.”). For an in-depth examination of Washington’s waiver of
sovereign immunity for tortious conduct, see generally Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna,
Washington State’s 45-Year Experiment in Governmental Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1
(2005); Debra L. Stephens & Bryan P. Harnetiaux, The Value of Government Tort Liability:
Washington State’s Journey from Immunity to Accountability, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 35 (2006).
5. When a plaintiff alleges that the state has violated a constitutional provision, Washington
courts have authority to declare the state action unconstitutional. See Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State,
No. 69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013) (implying that had the
plaintiff “identif[ied] a constitutional basis from which [the court] could find the State’s inaction to
be unconstitutional” the court could have addressed the issue pursuant to its authority under RCW
7.24.010). Revised Code of Washington 7.24.010 provides the court with the “power to declare
rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.24.010 (2014). See generally McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 477, 269 P.3d at 227
(illustrating that there is a constitutional basis for enforcement of the right to amply funded
education).
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. The concept of amending state constitutions to include a public trust duty is not new. See, e.g.,
Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment
for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm
Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 74 (2009) (recognizing that some state constitutions contain public trust
provisions and recommending that states “could amend their constitutions to make the trust duty
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radical at first glance, this Comment will demonstrate that it is not
radical 8 and that it is necessary. 9
This Comment proceeds in two parts. Part I shows that adding this
amendment to the Washington State Constitution would not be a radical
departure from Washington’s history, current policy, existing
constitutional structure, and national and international trends. First, this
Part provides an overview of the public trust doctrine—both generally 10
and in Washington specifically. 11 As this Comment illustrates,
Washington’s public trust doctrine is well established, in line with the
doctrine’s ancient origins and its modern interpretation in other states, 12
and that the traditional, narrow public trust doctrine is already enshrined
in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution.13 This
Comment then explains how there is room for expansion of
Washington’s common law public trust doctrine. 14 As Part I
demonstrates, codifying a broad public trust duty in a constitutional
amendment would not be a radical leap from existing Washington
common law.
Part I continues with a discussion of current Washington laws that
exemplify an existing commitment to the environment. 15 It then
discusses other constitutionally protected positive rights, demonstrating
that including one for the environment would not be unprecedented, and
would allow the State Constitution to reflect Washingtonians’ values.16
This Part concludes with an overview of the national and international
scene. 17 In addition to providing a broad overview of the frequency of
constitutional environmental protection provisions, this Part provides six
concrete examples—three national 18 and three international 19—of how
this right has been utilized elsewhere to protect the environment and
tackle major environmental challenges.
explicit”).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part I.B.1.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part I.B.2.
15. See infra Part I.C. This Part highlights some of the aspirational language the Washington
State Legislature has adopted in its environmental legislation. Part II.A, infra, will show that these
aspirations have not been met.
16. See infra Part I.D.
17. See infra Part I.E.
18. See infra Parts I.E.1.a–c.
19. See infra Parts I.E.2.a–c.
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While Part I lays the groundwork for why the proposed amendment
would not be a radical step, Part II explains why such an amendment is
necessary to protect the health and welfare of Washingtonians. This Part
first explores some of Washington’s existing environmental problems,
including air, 20 water, 21 and land/soil pollution. 22 It then details why a
constitutional amendment—not stronger legislation or the common
law—is necessary to address these, and other, environmental
challenges. 23
The Author freely admits that amending the State Constitution will
not immediately solve all environmental problems. However, as this
Comment demonstrates, including the right to a healthy environment in
the State Constitution is not radical. It is, however, a necessary first step
to ensure that the people, the courts, and the legislature have the tools to
tackle today’s worst environmental problems.
I.

AMENDING THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
WOULD NOT BE A RADICAL STEP

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include a positive
right to a healthy environment that is a codification of a broad public
trust duty is not a radical departure from existing Washington law and
policy. Washington’s long history with the public trust doctrine, 24 its
inclusion of the traditional doctrine in its Constitution, 25 and the
possibility of common law expansion of the doctrine 26 indicate that the
state is ready to accept a broader public trust doctrine. Current
Washington law, which demonstrates an ethos of environmental
protectionism, 27 and a state constitution, which traditionally reflects the
people’s mores, 28 both indicate that including a strong environmental
provision in the Constitution would be in line with Washingtonians’
convictions. 29 Finally, amending the State Constitution would be
consistent with both national and international trends of including
strong, positive environmental protections directly in states’

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part I.B.1.
Id.
See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra Parts I.C & D.
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constitutions. 30
A.

The Deep Roots of the Public Trust Doctrine

It has long been recognized that the government has a duty to keep
and protect certain resources for the public at large. 31 This duty, known
as the public trust doctrine, has its roots in Roman law. 32 The Institutes
of Justinian declared that certain resources, namely the air, sea, seashore, and running water, were “by natural law common to all.” 33 This
declaration is recognized as Ancient Rome’s public trust doctrine. 34 This
expansive public trust doctrine was also present in medieval European
law. 35 Eleventh-century French law stated that certain resources,
including “the public highways and byways, running water and springs,
meadows, pastures, forests, heaths and rocks” were open to use by all
people, and were not owned or exclusively used by lords. 36 Professor
Sax, the founding father of the modern public trust doctrine,37 explained
that in medieval Europe it was logical for the common places—like the
forests and pastures—to be held for the public, since their public use was
the basis of the feudal economy. 38 This medieval customary law
incorporated the developed expectations of the community into the
ultimate determination of rights and uses. 39 Determinations based on the
public trust doctrine were allowed to consider the stability of society
along with formalities like title ownership.40
The doctrine has persevered through time and place, and was
recognized in England and the United States after independence. In
30. See infra Part I.E.
31. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 699 (2006). See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970) (describing the public trust doctrine).
32. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working
Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 224 (2006); see also Rettkowski v. Dep’t
of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 239, 858 P.2d 232, 243 (1993) (Guy, J., dissenting).
33. Rettkowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 239, 858 P.2d at 243 (Guy, J., dissenting) (quoting J. INST. 2.1.1
(J. Moyle trans., 1896)).
34. Id.
35. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 185, 189 (1980).
36. Id. (quoting M. BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (1966)).
37. See Douglas Martin, Joseph L. Sax, 78, Dies; Pioneered Environmental Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2014, at B16.
38. Sax, supra note 35, at 189.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Id. “The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of
expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title.” Id. at 188.
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England, the doctrine established that the Crown held the beds of
navigable waters in an unbreakable trust for the people so that they
might enjoy commerce, navigation, and the fisheries. 41 The United
States 42 inherited the public trust doctrine from the English Crown upon
independence. 43 Under the doctrine, states hold the title to navigable
waters, to the lands under navigable waters, and to land under
tidewaters, in trust for the people of the state. 44 The trust ensures that the
people “may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.” 45 States may grant parcels of this
submerged protected land for building structures like docks and
wharves, which aid commerce, so long as those parcels, once built upon,
“do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.” 46 The states have the power to define the boundaries of
public trust protection within their borders. 47 However, at no point may a
state generally abdicate its control over water or land held in trust such
that it is completely outside of state control and no longer beneficial for
the general public. 48
The modern incarnation of the public trust doctrine in the United
41. Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 671, 673 (1991).
42. An in-depth and detailed view of the public trust doctrine within the United States more
broadly is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more detailed look at the public trust doctrine in
the United States, see generally, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The
Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781 (2010)
(describing the contours of the public trust doctrine in the United States).
43. Johnson, supra note 41, at 674.
44. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); see also Craig, supra note 42, at 801–
02 (“The original 13 states acquired title to beds and banks underlying tidal and, as would later be
confirmed, navigable-in-fact, nontidal waters as a matter of their conquest of England. All other
states acquired such ownership by operation of the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which all
subsequent states were admitted with the same rights as the original 13.” (footnotes omitted)).
45. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
46. Id.
47. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (stating that “it has been long
established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in
public trust”); see also, e.g., Patrick Redmond, The Public Trust in Wildlife: Two Steps Forward,
Two Steps Back, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 258 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court in Phillips
Petroleum Co. “acknowledged that the states are free to narrow or expand the zone of public trust
protection”).
48. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452–53 (“The State can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as
to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels
mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be
disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).
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States collects various common law rules to protect certain natural
resources for the people. 49 The core of the doctrine is that the state
cannot sell or give up its control of navigable waters, their beds and
tidelands (“public trust resources”). 50 The state controls these resources
for the benefit of the people, and, “in its strongest formulations, has an
affirmative duty to exercise ‘continuing supervision’ over their
management to preserve them as fully as possible.” 51
In the United States, the federal government does not determine the
bounds of the public trust doctrine. However, some elements are
common amongst the states. Throughout the United States, the public
trust doctrine protects salt and fresh waters that are navigable-in-fact, 52
the beds of those waters, and the shoreland up to the high tide/water
mark. 53 Outside of this traditional scope of the public trust doctrine, each
state has the power to expand or contract the protection of the public
trust doctrine within its own borders. 54 This power is limited, however,
by the states’ inability to fully abrogate state control over public trust
land. 55
Although the public trust doctrine traditionally protects three rights
(navigation, commerce, and fisheries 56), some states have expanded their
public trust doctrine beyond these traditional geographic and/or purposebased boundaries. 57 At a basic level, many western states’ public trust
doctrines encompass waters that are not navigable-in-fact for
commercial vessels, but are navigable-in-fact for small personal pleasure
crafts. 58 Some states have gone even further, 59 giving greater strength
and breadth to the public trust doctrine. For example, when dealing with
water extraction in California, the public trust doctrine applies to non49. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 239, 858 P.2d 232, 243 (1993) (Guy, J.,
dissenting) (citing W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16, at 170–71 (1977) (“The public trust
doctrine is a collection of common law principles recognizing that some types of natural resources
are held in trust by government for the benefit of the public.”)).
50. Redmond, supra note 47, at 250; Wood, supra note 7, at 80 (2009) (noting that the traditional
public trust resources are “navigable waters and soils under them” but arguing that these resources
“were part of a broader category of property imbued with the public trust”).
51. Redmond, supra note 47, at 250 (footnote omitted).
52. For a more complete explanation of navigable-in-fact see Johnson, supra note 41, at 677–78.
53. Id. at 678.
54. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); see also Redmond, supra
note 47, at 258.
55. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892).
56. Johnson, supra note 41, at 678 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387).
57. For a more detailed overview of the contours of the public trust doctrine throughout different
states in the United States, see generally Craig, supra note 42; Klass, supra note 31.
58. Johnson, supra note 41, at 681.
59. For additional examples other than those provided in this section, see id. at 681–83.
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navigable tributaries of navigable waters. 60 Massachusetts’ public trust
doctrine covers state parks 61 and swamps, 62 regardless of whether they
are connected to navigable waters. 63 Similarly, in New York, the public
trust extends to parkland, and prohibits the use of parkland for even
environmentally friendly activities like recycling and composting. 64
In Pennsylvania, the public trust doctrine is enshrined in the
Commonwealth’s Constitution 65 and is one of the strongest and broadest
public trust doctrines in the country. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has stated that the public trust doctrine “establishes the
Commonwealth’s duties with respect to Pennsylvania’s commonlyowned public natural resources, which are both negative (i.e.,
prohibitory) and affirmative (i.e., implicating enactment of legislation
and regulations).” 66 These so-called negative rights impose upon
Pennsylvania “a duty to refrain from permitting or encouraging the
degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources,
whether . . . through direct state action . . . [or] because of the state’s
failure to restrain the actions of private parties.” 67 In addition to the
prohibition on state conduct, Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine also
imposes a positive duty on the Commonwealth “to act affirmatively to
protect the environment, via legislative action.” 68 Combined, the public
trust doctrine imposes upon Pennsylvania “a duty to prevent and remedy
the degradation, diminution, or depletion of [Pennsylvania’s] public
60. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983)
(Mono Lake case holding that the public trust doctrine applies to “diversion of nonnavigable
tributaries” to protect navigable waters); see also Johnson, supra note 41, at 681 (“The California
court made it clear that ‘if the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy
navigation and other public trust uses in navigable waters, it should equally apply to constrain the
extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests. Both actions result in the
same damage to the public interest.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.
2d at 720)); Redmond, supra note 47, at 258–59.
61. Johnson, supra note 41, at 682 (citing Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d
114 (Mass. 1966)).
62. Id. (citing Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969)).
63. Id.
64. In re Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 31145/06, 2013 WL 6916531, at *5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2013).
65. The third clause of section 27 of the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution
states, “As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.” PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. This provision “establishes the public trust
doctrine with respect to these natural resources (the corpus of the trust), and designates ‘the
Commonwealth’ as trustee and the people as the named beneficiaries.” Robinson Twp. v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 956 (Pa. 2013). Pennsylvania’s constitutional provision will be
discussed at greater length infra Part I.E.1.c.
66. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955–56.
67. Id. at 957.
68. Id. at 958.
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natural resources. As a fiduciary, the Commonwealth has a duty to act
toward the corpus of the trust—the public natural resources—with
prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.” 69 Pennsylvania must uphold its
fiduciary duty to protect and safeguard the Commonwealth’s natural
resources for both the present and future generations. 70 It must consider
both short- and long-term environmental impacts of proposed action—or
inaction—and ensure that future generations have “equal access” to the
Commonwealth’s natural resources. 71 Pennsylvania’s clear articulation
of its expansive and duty-imposing public trust doctrine is a prime
example of how states may extend their public trust doctrine beyond the
traditional protection 72 of navigable waters, their beds, and their
shorelands.
The public trust doctrine has a long and well-accepted history. It has
been part of American law since independence. Although it is
traditionally applicable only to navigable waters, their beds and
tidelands, each state can determine the bounds of its public trust
doctrine. Indeed, many states have expanded the doctrine to include
additional lands and waters, giving state protection to great swaths of the
environment.
B.

The Public Trust Doctrine: Washington’s Duty to Its Current and
Future Citizens

Washington’s adoption, interpretation, and application of the public
trust doctrine are in line with the doctrine’s ancient origins and modern
interpretation elsewhere in the United States. The public trust doctrine
has been recognized in Washington since at least 1901. 73 The doctrine
has, from its inception, been used to protect the water resources for
public purposes. 74 Safeguarding natural resources for citizens is a
concept that is not new—not for Washington, and not in the law more
broadly. 75
This Section describes the history and evolution of the public trust
doctrine in Washington. It then shows how Washington’s acceptance of
69. Id. at 957.
70. Id. at 959.
71. Id.
72. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 676–78.
73. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 499–500, 64 P. 735, 737–38
(1901); see also F. Lorraine Bodi, The Public Trust Doctrine in the State of Washington: Does it
Make Any Difference to the Public?, 19 ENVTL. L. 645, 646 (1989).
74. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 667 & n.7, 732 P.2d 989, 993 & n.7 (1987); Bodi,
supra note 73, at 646.
75. See Klass, supra note 31, at 702.
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the public trust doctrine is consistent with the doctrine’s historic roots
and with its acceptance elsewhere in the United States. This section
wraps up with a discussion of the traditional public trust doctrine that is
codified in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution,
and a discussion of how Washington’s common law public trust doctrine
has room for expansion.
1.

Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine

Washington has a long history of accepting the public trust doctrine:
it has been recognized in the state for over a century. In 1901, in City of
New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 76 the Washington State Supreme
Court explained the essential characteristics of the State’s ownership of
navigable waters, their beds, and the tidelands, which passed to the states
from the English Crown after the American Revolution:
The title to lands under tide waters in the sea, arms, and inlets
thereof, and in tidal rivers . . . was, by the common law, deemed
to be vested in the king, as a public trust, to subserve and protect
the public right to use them as a common highway for
commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his
proprietary interest, could grant the soil so that it should become
private property; but his grant was subject to the paramount right
of the public use of navigable waters, which he could neither
destroy nor abridge. In every such grant there was an implied
reservation of the public right. 77
The traditional, limited doctrine was codified in 1889 in article XVII,
section 1 of the State Constitution. 78 That section provides:
The [S]tate of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and
shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the
line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and
flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water
within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes: Provided, that
this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person
from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the
state. 79
The Washington State Supreme Court has held repeatedly that under
article XVII, section 1, Washington may sell or otherwise dispose of the
76.
77.
78.
79.

24 Wash. 493, 64 P. 735 (1901).
Id. at 499, 64 P. at 737.
Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 666–67, 732 P.2d at 992–93.
WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (emphasis in original). For a history of this amendment, see
ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 229–34 (2d ed.
2013).
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tidelands and shorelands to private individuals. 80 However, even private
ownership of tidelands and shorelands is subject to “the paramount
public right of navigation and the fishery.” 81 The Court has defined
navigable waters to include those that can be used for boats, modes of
water transportation, and floating logs. 82
The Washington State Supreme Court revisited the public trust
doctrine in 1969 in Wilbour v. Gallagher. 83 In Wilbour, a class action
was brought against landowners who had filled in a portion of their land
that had previously been artificially submerged for a portion of the year
by closing a dam, which raised the level of navigable Lake Chelan. 84
The Court found that for the thirty-five years prior to the defendants
filling in their land, that land—when submerged—was openly used by
the public “for fishing, boating, swimming and for general recreational
use.” 85 The Court held that the submerged land was subject to the public
right of navigation and the incidental public rights of fishing and
recreation. 86 The defendants could not infringe on the public’s use of the
navigable water, and thus the Court ordered that the fill be removed. 87
However, when the land was not submerged, the Court held that the
landowners could “keep trespassers off their land, and may do with the
land as they wish[ed] consistent with the right of navigation when it is
submerged.” 88 The Court treated the artificially fluctuating waters the
same as it would have treated naturally fluctuating waters: when the land
is submerged, the public can exercise its right to utilize the waters; when
the land is not submerged, the private owners’ rights prevail and the
public does not have the right to access that land. 89
Wilbour expanded the public trust doctrine in Washington in two
80. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 666–67 & n.7, 732 P.2d at 993 & n.7.
81. Id. at 667, 732 P.2d at 993.
82. See Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 274, 75 P. 807, 809 (1904); Craig, supra note 42, at
817.
83. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969).
84. Id. at 309, 462 P.2d at 234–35.
85. Id. at 312, 462 P.2d at 236.
86. Id. at 316, 462 P.2d at 239.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 315, 462 P.2d at 238 (“[I]n the situation of a naturally varying water level, the
respective rights of the public and of the owners of the periodically submerged lands are dependent
upon the level of the water. As the level rises, the rights of the public to use the water increase since
the area of water increases; correspondingly, the rights of the landowners decrease since they cannot
use their property in such a manner as to interfere with the expanded public rights. As the level and
the area of the water decreases, the rights of the public decrease and the rights of the landowners
increase as the waters drain off their land, again giving them the right to exclusive possession until
their lands are again submerged.”).
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ways. 90 First, it established that even if water level fluctuates, and even
if that fluctuation is artificial, the public right to use navigable waters
was paramount. 91 Second, the Court defined the “incidental rights of
fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational
purposes” as “corollary to the right of navigation and the use of public
waters.” 92 The public can exercise these corollary rights in the same way
it may exercise its right of navigation. 93 For determining the scope of
public use for purposes of the public trust doctrine, there is no
distinction between the right of navigation and the incidental rights of
recreation and fishing.
In 1987, the Washington State Supreme Court provided the “classic
exposition” 94 of the state’s modern public trust doctrine in Caminiti v.
Boyle. 95 In Caminiti, the Court explained that “the state’s ownership of
tidelands and shorelands is . . . comprised of two distinct aspects.” 96 The
first—jus privatum (private property interest)—provides that, “[a]s
owner, the state holds full proprietary rights in tidelands and shorelands
and has fee simple title to such lands. Thus, the state may convey title to
tidelands and shorelands.” 97 The second—jus publicum (public authority
interest)—is the “principle that the public has an overriding interest in
navigable waterways and [t]he lands under them.” 98 Jus publicum is the
public trust doctrine, 99 and it constrains the state in what it may and may
not do. The Court explained: “[t]he state can no more convey or give
away this jus publicum interest than it can ‘abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.’” 100
In Washington, the jus publicum right includes navigation and fishery, as
well as the right to other incidental recreational purposes. 101 Under its
jus publicum obligations, the state holds these lands “in trust for the
public,” and “[i]t is this principle which is referred to as the ‘public trust
90. Bodi, supra note 73, at 647.
91. Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 315–16, 462 P.2d at 238 (“[T]he public has the right to go where the
navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters lie over privately owned lands.”); see also
Bodi, supra note 73, at 647.
92. Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 316, 462 P.2d at 239; see also Bodi, supra note 73, at 647.
93. Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 316, 462 P.2d at 239.
94. Redmond, supra note 47, at 296.
95. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987).
96. Id. at 668, 732 P.2d at 993.
97. Id. The emphasis of this Comment is on the second aspect of ownership, jus publicum, and
thus will not further discuss jus privatum.
98. Id. at 668, 732 P.2d at 994.
99. Id. at 669, 732 P.2d at 994.
100. Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)).
101. Id. (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969)).
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doctrine,’” which “has always existed in the State of Washington.” 102
The same year that the Washington State Supreme Court decided
Caminiti, it also ruled on Orion Corp. v. State. 103 In Orion Corp., the
Court reaffirmed that the public trust doctrine does, and has always,
existed in Washington, and that the doctrine “requires the state to
maintain its dominion in trust for the people.” 104 In addition, the Court
reiterated that where there is a public trust issue—for example, the sale
of tidelands, which affects the people’s need to access navigable
waters—the right of fishery and navigation is the “paramount public
right” that the State must protect.105 The Court also added a new layer to
the public trust doctrine, describing it as a doctrine that “resembles ‘a
covenant running with the land (or lake or marsh or shore) for the
benefit of the public and the land’s dependent wildlife.’” 106 Importantly,
the Court explicitly refused to “decide the total scope of the doctrine,”107
indicating that the doctrine in Washington is still developing and
growing. 108
Eleven years after Caminiti and Orion Corp., the Court took another
step toward expanding the public trust doctrine in Weden v. San Juan
County. 109 After finding that noise and traffic from personal watercrafts
threatened birds and mammals throughout San Juan County, and
conflicted with other traditional uses of the shoreline, the county banned
the use of personal watercrafts (PWCs). 110 The Court upheld this
ordinance. 111 In response to a public trust challenge to the ordinance, the
Court held that, although the ordinance did prohibit a specific form of
recreation, the waters were still open to the public, including PWC
owners who used a different form of recreation. 112 The Court defined the
public trust doctrine as protecting “public ownership interests in certain
uses of navigable waters and underlying lands, including navigation,
commerce, fisheries, recreation, and environmental quality.” 113 The
102. Id. at 669–70, 732 P.2d at 994.
103. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
104. Id. at 639, 747 P.2d at 1072.
105. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072.
106. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072–73 (quoting Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It
Amphibious?, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 118 (1986)).
107. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
108. See Bodi, supra note 73, at 650.
109. 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998).
110. Id. at 685–88, 958 P.2d at 276–78.
111. Id. at 709, 958 P.2d at 288.
112. Id. at 699, 958 P.2d at 283–84.
113. Id. at 698, 958 P.2d at 283 (emphasis added) (quoting Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public
Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524
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Court concluded, “it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to
sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and
wildlife of this State.” 114 The court seemingly assumed that the
protection of wildlife fell within the scope of Washington’s public trust
doctrine 115 and stated that the public trust doctrine includes protection of
environmental quality. 116 This common law extension of the doctrine has
had practical effects. After Weden, the Shoreline Hearings Board, 117
which reviews permits under the Shoreline Management Act, 118
indicated that “the public interest in access to and enjoyment of the
shoreline ‘necessarily includes a component of environmental and
habitat protection.’” 119
Of course, the Court has recognized limitations on the public trust
doctrine. In Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 120 the Washington
State Supreme Court declined to invoke the public trust doctrine in
deciding whether the Department of Ecology had authority to issue
cease-and-desist orders to prohibit irrigation farmers from making
groundwater withdrawals. 121 Although the Court admitted that the public
trust doctrine is “partially encapsulated” in article XVII, section 1 of the
State Constitution, it declined to apply the doctrine to the issues in
Rettkowski for two reasons. 122 First, because the court had never
extended the public trust doctrine to apply to ground water or nonnavigable waters. 123 Second, because the state—not any particular state
(1992)).
114. Id. at 700, 958 P.2d at 284 (emphasis added).
115. Redmond, supra note 47, at 298.
116. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 698, 958 P.2d at 283 (quoting Johnson et al., supra note 113, at
524).
117. The Shoreline Hearings Board is “invested by the [Shoreline Management Act (SMA)] with
authority over permitting reviews under section 90.58.180, [and] has viewed the SMA’s primary
mandate as maintaining ‘public use and enjoyment of the shorelines,’ which covers the right to
navigation but includes other forms of public access and even visual impacts.” Redmond, supra
note 47, at 299 (quoting Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, SHB No. 00-037, 2001
WL 1022097, at *9 (Wash. Shorelines Hearings Bd. 2001)). The SMA will be discussed at greater
length infra Parts I.C & II.A.2.
118. The Shoreline Management Act was passed in 1971 and was prompted, at least in part, by
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), and the Court’s “question[ing] the
appropriateness of filling and other tideland development absent a state regulatory process.” Bodi,
supra note 73, at 647.
119. Redmond, supra note 47, at 299 (quoting Ass’n of Wash. Bus., 2001 WL 1022097, at *9).
120. 122 Wash. 2d 219, 858 P.2d 232 (1993).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 232, 858 P.2d at 239.
123. Id. It is important to note that the Court said that it had “never previously interpreted” the
doctrine to cover these waters; it did not say that it could never interpret the public trust doctrine to
apply to groundwater and non-navigable water. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court included a

12 - Cohen - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

FOREVER EVERGREEN

4/13/2015 11:55 AM

363

agency—carries the duty established by the public trust doctrine. 124
Later, in State v. Longshore, 125 the Washington State Supreme Court
held that the public trust doctrine does not protect the public’s right to
gather all water-dependent creatures. 126 The doctrine “does not
encompass the right to gather naturally occurring clams on private
property.” 127 The Court reasoned that, “because of the characteristics of
clams, clamming activity is more closely related to ownership of
underlying land than to utilization of public waters.” 128 However, even
in Longshore, the Court reiterated one of the central holdings in
Caminiti: Although the state can “invest individuals with ownership of
tidelands and shorelands,” it can do so only as long as that investment
does not interfere with “the paramount public right of navigation and
fishery.” 129 Most recently, in Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 130 the
Court reiterated that the duties imposed by the public trust doctrine as
codified in article XVII of the State Constitution are imposed only on the
state, and therefore can be utilized only by the state and not by a
municipality. 131
In sum, Washington has a clearly established public trust duty, dating
back to at least 1901. This doctrine—at least in its traditional, narrow
form—is partially codified in article XVII, section 1 of the State
Constitution. The fact that the public trust doctrine is enshrined in the
State Constitution has not only allowed the Court to expand the state’s
obligations under the public trust doctrine through case law, but also
indicates that codifying this broader public trust duty in the Constitution
would be consistent with the existing Constitution. Although the
Washington State Supreme Court has not defined the outer limits of the
doctrine, the Court seems to be expanding public trust protection to the
natural resources associated with the state’s navigable waters. The
Court’s semi-frequent and relatively contemporary application of the
doctrine indicates that it is alive and well, and remains a vibrant, if
vulnerable, 132 tool that could be used to further environmental protection
footnote directly after this statement expressing this sentiment. Id. at 232 n.5, 858 P.2d at 239 n.5
(“We similarly do not need to address the scope of the doctrine today.”). This point will be
addressed in greater detail infra Part I.B.2.
124. Rettowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 232, 858 P. 2d at 239.
125. 141 Wash. 2d 414, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000).
126. Id. at 429, 5 P.3d at 1263.
127. Id. at 428, 5 P.3d at 1263.
128. Id. at 427, 5 P.3d at 1263.
129. Id. (citing Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 667, 732 P.2d 989, 993 (1987)).
130. 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007).
131. Id. at 695–96, 169 P.3d at 21–22; see also Redmond, supra note 47, at 302–03.
132. Aside from the navigable waters and their beds, shorelands, and tidelands protected by
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in Washington.
2.

There Is Room for Expansion of Washington’s Common Law
Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine provides the state with a mechanism to
reduce pollution in the state’s waters, and protect the public’s interest “in
clean water, environmental quality, fish and wildlife, and recreation.” 133
Although the traditional doctrine—protecting navigable waters and their
attendant lands—is enshrined in the State Constitution, it seems unlikely
that the Court would find constitutional public trust protection for
resources that are not directly tied to navigable waters and their lands. 134
That being said, while the Washington State Supreme Court has
provided some guidance on the bounds of the public trust doctrine, it has
article XVII, any application of the public trust doctrine is based solely on common law. This leaves
the doctrine vulnerable to encroachment and erosion by the legislature and the courts. See infra
Parts II.B.1–2.
133. Ralph W. Johnson, The Emerging Recognition of a Public Interest in Water: Water Quality
Control by the Public Trust Doctrine, WATER & THE AM. W. 127, 128 (1988).
134. Article XVII, section 1 specifically refers to the State’s ownership of “the beds and shores of
all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide . . . and up to and
including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes.” WASH.
CONST. art XVII, § 1. Caminiti v. Boyle specifically referred to this constitutional provision, and
cases dealing only with navigable waters and other lands covered by this provision, when that case
held that the public trust doctrine had always existed in Washington. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 666–70,
732 P.2d 989, 992–94 (1987). After discussing Caminiti’s holding, the Court in Orion Corp. v. State
also expressly referred to the State’s ownership of tidelands and shorelands as the basis for the
application of the public trust doctrine to the tidelands at issue in the case. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639,
747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987) (“Because title in and sovereignty over Washington’s tidelands and
shorelands vested in the state upon admission into the Union, the public trust doctrine applies to
Orion’s Padilla Bay tidelands.”). The Court also recognized that the State’s public trust duty in
tidelands and shorelands was based on the public’s need to access navigable waters. Id. at 640, 747
P.2d at 1073; see also Steven W. Turnbull, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: Accommodating the
Public Need Within Constitutional Bounds—Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988), 63 WASH. L. REV. 1087, 1096, 1107 (1988).
In the foundational cases regarding the constitutionally enshrined public trust doctrine, the Court
has dealt only with those waters and lands that are protected under article XVII, section 1. It seems
unlikely that the Court would hold that the constitutionally enshrined public trust expands beyond
those waters and lands specified in article XVII, section 1. See Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, No.
69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013). In Svitak ex rel. Svitak v.
State, the court of appeals dismissed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that alleged
the public trust doctrine created an affirmative duty on the state to protect the atmosphere because,
at least in part, “the issue is not justiciable as there is no allegation of violation of a specific statute
or constitution.” Id. By finding that there was no allegation of a constitutional violation, the court
necessarily did not extend the constitutionally enshrined public trust doctrine to include the
atmosphere. Had the court concluded that the constitutional public trust doctrine—outlined in article
XVII, section 1—included natural resources like the atmosphere, there would have been a violation
of a constitutional provision. Thus it seems likely that any expansion of the public trust doctrine
beyond those waters and lands would not be grounded in the Constitution, and would instead
necessarily have to be based in common law.
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repeatedly refused to explicitly define the limits of its scope. 135 The
Court has thus left at least the common law aspect of Washington’s
public trust doctrine open to expansion. 136
Washington courts have utilized the public trust doctrine as the basis
for regulations that restrict an individual’s right of fishery by applying it
in situations where the state was protecting its natural shellfish
resources. 137 In Washington Geoduck Harvest Association v. Washington
State Department of Natural Resources, 138 Division 2 of the Washington
State Court of Appeals upheld the Department of Natural Resources’
(DNR) geoduck management system. 139 First, the court held that
because the geoducks were being harvested from the beds of navigable
waters on state-owned land, the public trust doctrine applied. 140 The
court then stated that the DNR’s harvesting regulations—which
regulated when individuals could harvest geoducks from particular tracts
of state land—promoted the public interest, and thus were not
improper. 141 The court found that “[t]he public trust doctrine, as applied
to DNR’s regulation of commercial geoduck harvesting, protects the
public right to recreation, commerce, and commercial fishing, all of
which are bolstered by the state’s system of facilitating sustainable
geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource.” 142 The
court thus utilized the public trust doctrine to support the DNR’s
regulation of geoduck harvesting, recognizing that although the
regulation did constrict individuals’ rights of fishery, it was for the
overall benefit of the natural resource and therefore the public. 143 The
court upheld the DNR’s regulations and procedures as constitutional,
135. See Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232 n.5, 858 P.2d 232, 239 n.5
(1993); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987).
136. The Court has stated in dicta that “we have never previously interpreted the doctrine to
extend to non-navigable waters or groundwater,” but it did not indicate that that would not be
possible in the future. Rettkowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 232, 858 P.2d at 239. As previously indicated,
states are free to expand the public trust doctrine beyond the traditional bounds of navigable waters,
and their beds and tidelands. See supra Part I.A. However, any expansion of the common law public
trust doctrine would be vulnerable to legislative encroachment and could not act as the basis for
litigation. See infra Part II.B.
137. See Craig, supra note 42, at 828.
138. 124 Wash. App. 441, 101 P.3d 891 (2004).
139. Id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897.
140. Id. at 451, 101 P.3d at 896.
141. Id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897 (“[T]he state’s action is improper only where it does not promote,
or where it substantially impairs, the public interest. Here, the opposite is true.” Please note that the
language in the Pacific report varies slightly in that it says “the state’s action is only improper
where . . . .”).
142. Id.
143. See id.
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finding that they “serve[d] the public, satisfie[d] the public trust
doctrine’s requirements, and [were] not an unconstitutional infringement
on the public’s rights.” 144 The court has shaped the public trust doctrine
in Washington by using it as a restriction on individuals’ personal rights
for the benefit and preservation of the public resources.
State supreme court justices and court of appeals judges have
expressed a need to expand the public trust doctrine. The Weden court
defined the public trust doctrine as protecting environmental quality and
wildlife. 145 The general protection of environmental quality and wildlife
(other than fisheries) is beyond the traditional scope of the public trust
doctrine, which only protected navigable waters and their attendant
lands, for navigation, fisheries, and commerce. 146 In his Rettkowski
dissent, Justice Guy argued that the navigability requirement of the
public trust doctrine should be abandoned. 147 Following Professor Sax’s
assertion that “[t]he function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to
protect such public expectations against destabilizing changes,” 148 the
scope of the doctrine “is defined by the public’s need in those natural
resources necessary for social stability.” 149 Justice Guy argued that it
was time for the state to “recognize . . . the public’s interest . . . in water
as an essential natural, finite resource, not in water just as a public
highway or playground.” 150 To protect water as “an essential natural,
finite resource,” it is necessary to protect the environment overall.151 In
addition, Justice Guy’s conceptualization of the public trust doctrine, its
scope, and its purpose, could reasonably be expanded to protect other
non-water natural resources that are needed for social stability because
they are “an essential natural, finite resource.” 152
144. Id.
145. Weden v. San Juan Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d 678, 698–700, 958 P.2d 273, 283–84 (1998).
146. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 677–78.
147. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 239, 858 P.2d 232, 243 (1993) (Guy, J.,
dissenting).
148. Sax, supra note 35, at 188.
149. Rettkowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 242, 858 P.2d at 244 (Guy, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 242, 858 P.2d at 245.
151. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 7, at 83–84 (recognizing that all natural resources—both those
traditionally protected by the public trust doctrine and those, like groundwater and forests, that are
outside the scope of the traditional doctrine—are interconnected and arguing that to comport with
“ecological reality” the public trust doctrine must protect all natural resources); Air Pollution and
Water Quality, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/
cwa/tmdl/airdeposition_index.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (illustrating the link between air
pollution and water quality); infra Part II.A.2.
152. Indeed, at least one scholar has suggested that Washington’s forests—which are an
important source of income for the state—could be found to be public trust resources. See Daniel
Jack Chasan, A Trust for All the People: Rethinking the Management of Washington’s State Forests,
24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 44–47 (2000).
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Lower court judges have also indicated that the public trust doctrine
should or does encompass more than traditional navigable waters,
navigation, fisheries, and recreation. Court of Appeals, Division 2, Chief
Judge Quinn-Brintnall defined the state’s public trust duty as
encompassing the state’s “natural resources.” 153 The public trust doctrine
encompasses animals ferae naturae (wild animals), and “under
Washington’s inherent public trust doctrine the State and its people hold
this title [to animals ferae naturae] in trust for the use and the benefit of
all the people of this state, including those yet unborn.” 154 Chief Judge
Quinn-Brintnall cited Graves v. Dunlap 155 for this proposition. In
Graves, the Washington State Supreme Court stated that “the recognized
doctrine is that the title to game belongs to the state in its sovereign
capacity, and that the state holds this title in trust for the use and benefit
of the people of the state.” 156 This language, recognizing the traditional
common law doctrine relating to wild animals, 157 echoes public trust
language used in Caminiti 158 and indicates that the public trust doctrine
could be applied to non-water resources.
Finally, the public trust rights established in Caminiti require
protection of the environment that goes beyond just navigable waters.
Caminiti established that the right of navigation—and the incidental
right of fishing—is a protected interest of the public trust doctrine, as
codified in the State Constitution. 159 In addition, Caminiti explicitly
stated that the right to recreation in navigable waters is protected by the
public trust. 160 To protect the recreational values of water, the state must
protect the environment at large. 161 Similarly, protection of the fishery
“implicitly includes protection of water quality,” 162 and thus the overall

153. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 576, 103 P.3d 203,
208 (2004) (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., concurring).
154. Id. (citing Graves v. Dunlap, 87 Wash. 648, 651, 152 P. 532, 533 (1915)).
155. 87 Wash. 648, 152 P. 532 (1915).
156. Id. at 651, 152 P. at 533 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987) (“[T]he state holds
such dominion [over this state’s tidelands and shore lands] in trust for the public. It is this principle
which is referred to as the ‘public trust doctrine.’”).
159. Id. at 669, 732 P.2d at 994.
160. Id. (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969)).
161. In addition to negatively affecting fisheries, water pollution can have a negative effect on
recreation. For example, swimming in water that has toxic algal blooms (caused by nutrient
pollution) can result in liver or stomach illness, rashes, respiratory problems, and neurological
affects. See Nutrient Pollution: The Effects: Human Health, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/effects-human-health (last visited Dec. 24, 2014).
162. Johnson, supra note 41, at 678.
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environment. 163
If codified, 164 the public trust doctrine could be used as a check on
both state action and inaction. Caminiti adopted the United States
Supreme Court’s understanding of the duty of the state with regard to
trust lands. Quoting Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 165 the
Washington State Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he control of the State for
the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as
are used in promoting the interest of the public therein, or can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining.” 166 Under the Court’s precedent, the
state must retain control over its public trust resources so that it can
protect them. Although the Court adopted this language to determine if
legislation violated the public trust doctrine, it could readily be used to
determine if state inaction violates the public trust doctrine. If the state,
by its inaction, failed at any time to manage and protect its natural
resources for the benefit of the people, 167 it would be breaching its
public trust duty because it would no longer be maintaining control
sufficient to execute its duty to protect the resources for the people.
Protecting the overall environment is necessary for the State to fulfill
its mandate to protect public trust resources, lands, and waterways for
present and future generations. Expanding the public trust doctrine to
include broader environmental protections would be in line with the
existing constitutional provision, and follow the direction the Court has
been going. Enshrining the right to a healthy environment 168 in a
163. Water pollution can have devastating effects on fish populations. For example, excessive
amounts of phosphorous and nitrogen (nutrient pollution) from sources like agriculture, stormwater,
wastewater, and fossil fuels, can wash into water bodies, causing algal blooms which can create
toxins killing fish, reduce fish’s abilities to find food, and “cause entire populations to leave an area
or even die.” Nutrient Pollution: The Effects: Environment, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/effects-environment (last visited Dec. 24, 2014); Nutrient
Pollution: Sources and Solutions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/
nutrientpollution/sources-and-solutions (last visited Dec. 24, 2014).
164. The common law public trust doctrine alone cannot be the basis for litigation based on state
inaction. Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, No. 69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124, at *1–2 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 16, 2013).
165. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
166. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669–70, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 146 U.S. at 453).
167. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 577, 103 P.3d
203, 208 (2004) (“[T]he sovereign’s duty to manage its natural resources recognized in the public
trust doctrine is not time limited, and the primary beneficiaries of the sovereign’s exercise of its
public trust are those who have not yet been born or who are too young to vote. Thus, the sovereign
authority to regulate natural resources is circumscribed by its duty to manage natural resources well
for the benefit of future generations.” (emphasis in original)).
168. This Comment is meant to introduce the general proposition that amending the State
Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment is not radical and is necessary. However,
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constitutional amendment would be a natural extension of the state’s
existing public trust doctrine, which protects navigable waters and their
beds and tidelands, and is already enshrined in the Constitution.
c.

Current Washington Laws Demonstrate an Existing Commitment
to Environmental Protection

The Washington Legislature, as the voice of the people, has
demonstrated an existing commitment to environmental protection by
passing a variety of laws that seek to protect every aspect of the natural
environment. A comprehensive examination or even an overview of all
existing environmental laws in Washington is beyond the scope of this
Comment. What this Comment seeks to do is highlight a few examples
of such laws to demonstrate that there is an existing commitment to
environmental protection.
A primary example of the State’s commitment to environmental
protection is found in the Shoreline Management Act. The Act
recognizes the value and fragility of the shoreland, and the concern
throughout Washington relating to these fragile lands’ use, preservation,
and restoration. 169 The Act declares that:
It is the policy of the state to provide for the management of the
shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all
reasonable and appropriate uses. This policy is designed to
insure the development of these shorelines in a manner
which . . . will promote and enhance the public interest. This
policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the
public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the
waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting
generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights
incidental thereto.170
The Shoreline Management Act reflects the State’s commitment to
maintain the ecological health and natural character of shoreline areas.
Similarly, the Water Pollution Control Act 171 calls for pure waters
throughout the state, and the protection and proliferation of wildlife. The
Act declares that it is Washington’s policy “to maintain the highest
possible standards to insure the purity of all waters of the state consistent
with public health and public enjoyment thereof, the propagation and
precisely defining a “healthy environment” would require political debates and an analysis of
scientific data that are beyond the expertise of the Author and outside the scope of this Comment.
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (2014).
170. Id.
171. Id. §§ 90.48.010–90.48.906.
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protection of wild life, birds, game, fish, and other aquatic life, and the
industrial development of the state.” 172 The Water Pollution Control Act
recognizes the necessity of industrial development, but includes the
protection of wildlife as part of the official policy of the state, even
before it recognizes development.
Washington’s existing laws do not just protect water and shorelands.
The State’s commitment to environmental protection goes beyond those
narrow bounds to include the preservation of aquatic resources in their
natural form. 173 The Natural Area Preserves legislation 174 calls for the
protection of natural lands, along with their eco-systems. 175 Natural
lands are protected for current and future generations as areas “of
scientific research, teaching, as habitats of rare and vanishing species, as
places of natural historic and natural interest and scenic beauty, and as
living museums of the original heritage of the state.” 176
These laws are just a few of the many examples of Washington’s
existing legislative commitment to protecting and preserving the
environment for current and future generations. However, as will be
illustrated in Part II, 177 despite this commitment, Washington has not
lived up to these aspirational goals. As these laws demonstrate, a
constitutional amendment enshrining the right to a healthy environment
would be in line with Washington’s existing ethos. An amendment
would not only create a constitutional mandate that would force the state
to do better, but it would also provide the legislature with a clear signal
indicating the importance of protecting the environment in fact, not just
in aspirational statements.
D.

The Washington State Constitution Already Includes Positive
Rights and Reflects Washingtonians’ Values

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include a right to a
healthy environment would not be a radical step because the State
Constitution already includes positive rights, and the Constitution has
traditionally reflected Washingtonians’ values. First, the Washington
State Constitution already has enshrined positive rights. A “positive
172. Id. § 90.48.010.
173. Id. § 79.70.010 (2014) (“It is, therefore, the public policy of the state of Washington to
secure for the people of present and future generations the benefit of an enduring resource of natural
areas by establishing a system of natural area preserves, and to provide for the protection of these
natural areas.”).
174. Id. §§ 79.70.010–79.70.900.
175. Id. § 79.70.010.
176. Id.
177. See supra Part II.A.
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right” is one that requires government action, rather than restricts it.178
There are at least four constitutional provisions that enshrine positive
rights. Article II, section 35 requires the legislature to “pass necessary
laws for the protection of persons working in mines, factories and other
employments dangerous to life or deleterious to health; and fix pains and
penalties for the enforcement of the same.” 179 Article XIII, section 1
requires that the state provide “[e]ducational, reformatory, and penal
institutions.” 180 Article X, section 3 requires that the legislature “provide
by law for the maintenance of a soldiers’ home for honorably
discharged” members of the Union’s armed forces and “members of the
state militia disabled while in the line of duty and who are bona fide
citizens of the state.” 181 It should be noted that although article II,
section 35, article XIII, section 1, and article X, section 3, are positive
rights (meaning that they require government action), none of those
provisions are fully self-executing. 182 The plain language of article II,
section 35 requires the legislature to pass laws to protect workers. 183
Article XIII, section 1 “is not fully self-executing but requires
supplementation by ‘such regulations as may be provided by law.’” 184
Similarly, the plain language of article X, section 3 requires that the
legislature “provide by law” for veterans’ care.185
Article IX, section 1 provides a positive right that is self-executing. It
provides for the positive right to education: “[i]t is the paramount duty of
the state to make ample provision for the education of all children
residing within its borders.” 186 In McCleary v. State 187 the Washington
State Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision “confers on
children in Washington a positive constitutional right to an amply
funded education.” 188 Although the legislature must implement

178. Clayton, supra note 1, at 75.
179. WASH CONST. art. II, § 35.
180. WASH CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
181. WASH. CONST. art. X, § 3.
182. A self-executing constitutional provision is one that takes effect without any sort of
legislative action. See 16 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 89, available at
WestLaw.
183. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35.
184. See UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 214.
185. WASH. CONST. art. X, § 3; see also UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 181 (noting that the
legislature provided for the Washington Soldiers’ Home in chapter 72.36 of the Revised Code of
Washington).
186. WASH. CONST. art. IX § 1.
187. 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).
188. Id. at 483, 269 P.3d at 231 (emphasis added).
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guidelines to fulfill its mandate under the Constitution, 189 the provision
does not require any legislative action to become effective. 190 Children
have a right to education directly under the Constitution—no legislative
action is required. Including a positive right to a healthy environment
would not be a significant departure from existing Washington
constitutional law because the Constitution already provides for positive
rights. 191
Second, the Constitution has always reflected Washingtonians’
values. The Washington State Constitution was drafted during the
populist movement, and the document reflects the values of that time. 192
In response to people’s concerns about special interests, distrust of
railroads and corporations, and a “general objection to the concentration
of power in elites,” the Constitution “imposed numerous restrictions on
the legislature, scattered executive authority among independently
elected officials, intentionally hamstrung corporations, and provided
strong protections of individual liberties.” 193 These restrictions reflected
the populist beliefs of the majority farming community: “protection of a
self-sufficient way of life in the face of powerful commercial forces that
threatened to manipulate or control the common people.” 194
The Constitution accurately reflected the people’s ideals then, and for
many Washingtonians, it still does today. 195 However, “a component of
the state’s modern self-image that is absent from the document is a
provision entrenching the state’s strong outdoor recreation and
environmentalist spirit.” 196 In 2008, Washington joined the Pacific Coast
Collaborative, which prioritizes making the Pacific coast region a worldleader in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to fight climate change,197
189. See UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 170.
190. See McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 483, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (“The judiciary has the primary
responsibility for interpreting article IX, section 1 to give it meaning and legal effect.”).
191. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; see also Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government
Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV.
1459, 1464, 1474 (2010) (listing this amendment as a positive environmental right provided for in
the Washington State Constitution). These loans are used “for the conservation or more efficient use
of water, energy, or stormwater or sewer services.” WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 10. This provision
was passed to encourage conservation efforts, as “[c]onservation was seen as a good alternative to
new power plants.” UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 167.
192. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 4–5.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id. at 5, 11 (“[I]ndividualism and suspicion of big business (as well as big government)
remain strong in Washington State, and in that respect its constitution continues to reflect populist
attitudes.”).
196. Id. at 11.
197. Climate Change, PAC. COAST COLLABORATIVE, http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/
priorities/climateaction/Pages/ClimateAction.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
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and “leading the world in sustainable environmental management” to
protect the ocean and coastlines. 198 In 2013, Washington elected current
governor, Jay Inslee, “an environmental champion,” 199 who is making
environmentalism and clean energy a priority. 200 Washingtonians are
committed to protecting the environment, and it is time to amend the
Constitution to reflect these mores. The flexibility inherent in state
constitutions, 201 allows them to better reflect the aspirations of the
current generation. 202 Amending the Constitution to include a right to a
healthy environment would accurately reflect the values of the people,
something that the Constitution has done since it was first drafted.
E.

Amending the Washington State Constitution Would Be in Line
with National and International Trends

In recognition of the importance of strong environmental protections,
states nationally and internationally have incorporated broad
environmental protection principles into their constitutions. This section
demonstrates that there is a national and international trend toward
incorporating broad environmental protections into state constitutions.
Although not all states with these provisions utilize them, 203 some states
and countries have successfully relied on them to tackle serious
environmental problems. This Comment highlights six such cases—
three national, three international—to showcase the potential power of
these provisions and to demonstrate that courts have invoked
198. Ocean
Conservation,
PAC.
COAST
COLLABORATIVE,
http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/priorities/resource/Pages/ResourceConservation.aspx (last
visited Dec. 23, 2014).
199. My Position on Key Issues, JAY INSLEE: DEMOCRAT FOR GOVERNOR,
http://www.jayinslee.com/issues/key-issues (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
200. Issues, WASH. GOVERNOR: JAY INSLEE, http://www.governor.wa.gov/issues/default.aspx
(last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
201. State constitutions can be amended more easily than the federal Constitution. See Mila
Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 129), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2416300. Amendments to the Washington State Constitution must be
proposed by one of the branches of the legislature, approved by two-thirds of both branches of the
legislature, and then approved by a majority vote of the people. WASH. CONST. art. XXIII. This
process is arguably easier than amending the federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
(requiring two-thirds of both the House of Representatives and the Senate—or two-thirds of state
legislatures— to propose an amendment; the proposed amendment must then be approved by threefourths of state legislatures).
202. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 201, at manuscript at 129, 135.
203. Indeed, it has been argued that, “these constitutional provisions have [in general] had very
little observable impact on the environmental laws and policy of the states that adopted such
provisions.” James M. McElfish, Jr., State Environmental Law and Programs, 1 L. ENVTL.
PROTECTION § 7:3 (2014).
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constitutional provisions to strengthen environmental protection. 204 An
amendment to the Washington State Constitution that provides for broad
environmental protections would be in line with this national and
international trend, 205 and would be a powerful tool for tackling some of
the State’s most pressing environmental challenges.
1.

Nationally, States Are Incorporating a Right to a Healthy
Environment into Their Constitutions

Throughout the United States of America, states have incorporated
the right to a healthy environment in their own state constitutions. Every
state constitution drafted since 1959 addresses natural resources
preservation and environmental issues. 206 Six states with constitutions
enacted before 1959 address environmental issues through constitutional
amendments. 207 Forty-two state constitutions 208 “at least mention
environmental protection or natural resources.” 209 As of November
2014, sixteen states have a constitutional provision that explicitly
protects the environment. 210 Some states, like Alaska, 211 Montana, 212 and
204. A comprehensive overview of every example of courts invoking or not invoking these
constitutional provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
205. Parts I.E.1.a–c & I.E.2.a–c, infra, provide specific examples of where states and countries
have utilized these constitutional environmental protections to address environmental needs and
problems.
206. Klass, supra note 31, at 714. For additional information and examples of these varying
provisions, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and
Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 160–63 (2003).
207. Klass, supra note 31, at 714; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State
Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 871–73 (1996).
208. For additional information on how other states have incorporated the public trust doctrine
into their constitutions, see Klass, supra note 31, at 714–19.
209. Id. at 714. Of these forty-two state constitutions, “eight states have clear language granting
citizens environmental rights, eleven states include public policy statements on environmental
protection, and the remaining twenty-three states at least refer to natural resources or environmental
protection.” Id. at 714 n.85 (citing Robert J. Klee, What’s Good for School Finance Should Be Good
For Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and
Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 167 (2005)).
210. McElfish, supra note 203.
211. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for the utilization,
development, and conservation, of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and
waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.” (emphasis added)); ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3
(“Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for
common use.”); ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other
replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the
sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.”); Constitutional
Amendment Summary: 1966-2004 Proposed Amendment Titles & Vote Counts, OFF. OF THE
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR BYRON MALLOTT, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/services/alaskaconstitution/amendment-summary.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015). Taken together, the Alaska
Supreme Court has interpreted the aforementioned provisions of the Alaska Constitution to
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Louisiana, 213 included provisions protecting the environment and natural
resources directly in their constitutions, without utilizing amendments.
Other states began adopting constitutional amendments in the late
1960s and early 1970s which “were generally put in terms of declaring
the policy of the state, of establishing a ‘public trust’ over the
environment, or creating environmental ‘rights’ for the citizens of the
states.” 214 New York, for example, amended its Constitution in 1969 to
declare that “[t]he policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty.” 215 Similarly, Pennsylvania
amended its Constitution in 1971 to include a right to “clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment.” 216
Although it has been argued that these constitutional provisions
protecting the right to a healthy environment have generally “had very
“constitutionaliz[e] common law principles imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard
to the management of fish, wildlife and waters.” Redmond, supra note 47, at 255 (quoting
Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 493 (Alaska 1988)); see also Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60–61
(Alaska 1996).
212. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights.
They include the right to a clean and healthful environment . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“(1)
The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana
for present and future generations. (2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and
enforcement of this duty. (3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of
the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”); see also Thompson, supra note 206,
at 158 (highlighting the important position environmental protection provisions were given in
Montana’s 1972 Constitution).
213. This article refers to the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural
resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality
of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent
with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this
policy.”).
214. McElfish, supra note 203.
215. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (adopted Nov. 4, 1969) (“The policy of the state shall be to
conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty . . . . The legislature, in implementing
this policy, shall include adequate provision for the abatement of air and water pollution . . .[,] the
protection of agricultural lands, wetlands and shorelines, and the development and regulation of
water resources. The legislature shall further provide for the acquisition of lands and
waters . . . which because of their natural beauty, wilderness character, or geological, ecological or
historical significance, shall be preserved and administered for the use and enjoyment of the
people.”).
216. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (adopted May 18, 1971) (“The people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve
and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”); Article 1, Section 27. Added by Amendment of
May 18, 1971, DUQUESNE U., http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/
historical-research/legislative-histories/a1-s27-1971 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
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little observable impact on the environmental laws and policy of the
states that adopted” them, 217 some states have certainly put their
provisions to use. The following are three specific examples where a
state’s constitutional right to a healthy environment has been used to
strengthen environmental protection for the people’s benefit.
a.

Montana

Environmental protection was one of the major themes delegates
considered when drafting the 1972 Montana Constitution. 218 This theme
is reflected throughout the text of the Montana Constitution. Its
preamble begins with the statement: “We the people of Montana grateful
to God for the quiet beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains,
the vastness of our rolling plains . . . establish this constitution.”219
Article II of the 1972 Montana Constitution provides that, “[a]ll persons
are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right
to a clean and healthful environment.” 220 Article IX reiterates this
sentiment and creates an obligation to safeguard the environment for the
state and the people of Montana:
(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean
and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations. (2) The legislature shall provide for the
administration and enforcement of this duty. (3) The legislature
shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and
degradation of natural resources. 221
The right guaranteed in article II and the rights provided for in article
IX are “interrelated and interdependent.” 222 Although it is clear that
environmental protection was a priority for the drafters of the new
Constitution, what precisely this provision required of the State was left
open for the courts to decide. 223 As one Missoula delegate to the
217. McElfish, supra note 203; see also Thompson, supra note 206, at 158–59, 163–65 (noting
that constitutional provisions protecting the environment have had little impact).
218. KRYS HOLMES, MONTANA: STORIES OF THE LAND 425 (2008), available at
http://svcalt.mt.gov/education/textbook/TBTGPreOrder.asp (follow link provided; then click on
“Part 4: The Modern Montana Constitution”; then follow hyperlink for “Chapter 21”; then follow
hyperlink for “Online textbook: Chapter 21.” The direct link to Chapter 21 is
http://svcalt.mt.gov/education/textbook/Chapter21/Chapter21.pdf).
219. MONT. CONST. pmbl.
220. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
221. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
222. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999).
223. HOLMES, supra note 218, at 429.
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Constitutional Convention indicated, the drafters intended to leave the
extent of environmental protection open for litigation. 224
The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the level of scrutiny the
court must utilize “when the right to a clean and healthful environment
guaranteed by [a]rticle II, [s]ection 3 or those rights referred to in
[a]rticle IX, [s]ection 1 are implicated” in Montana Environmental
Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality. 225 In that
case, the court examined whether a statute 226 that allowed water test
discharges that degraded high quality waters without review violated
articles II and IX of the Montana Constitution, and if plaintiff
environmental groups had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the act. 227 After an extensive review of the history of the 1972
Constitution looking at the drafters’ intent, the Court interpreted article
II, section 3 and article IX, section 1 to give substantial protection to the
environment. 228 The Court held that a concrete showing of harm was not
required for plaintiffs to have standing. 229 The court further held that,
“the right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right
because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights found at [a]rticle II,
[s]ection 3 of Montana’s Constitution” 230 and therefore that strict
scrutiny must be applied to all rules and statutes that implicate those
rights. 231 By reading the constitutional provisions with the drafters’
224. Missoula delegate Mae Nan Ellingson said, “What did it mean to have a right to a clean and
healthful environment? To me, it meant that the citizen had the right to go to court to protect that
environment.” HOLMES, supra note 218, at 430 (quoting delegate Mae Nan Ellingson).
225. 988 P.2d 1236, 1244 (Mont. 1999).
226. Plaintiffs specifically contended that section 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995) “to the extent that
[it] allow[ed] discharges of water from watering well or monitoring well tests, which degrade[d]
high quality waters without review pursuant to Montana’s nondegradation policy” was void for
violating the constitutional provisions protecting the environment. Id. at 1237.
227. Id. at 1242.
228. Id. at 1249 (“[T]o give effect to the rights guaranteed by [a]rticle II, [s]ection 3 and [a]rticle
IX, [s]ection 1 of the Montana Constitution they must be read together and consideration given to
all of the provisions of [a]rticle IX, [s]ection 1 as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution.
In doing so, we conclude that the delegates’ intention was to provide language and protections
which are both anticipatory and preventative. The delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that
degree of environmental degradation which can be conclusively linked to ill health or physical
endangerment. Our constitution does not require that dead fish float on the surface of our state’s
rivers and streams before its farsighted environmental protections can be invoked. The delegates
repeatedly emphasized that the rights provided for in subparagraph (1) of [a]rticle IX, [s]ection 1
was linked to the legislature’s obligation in subparagraph (3) to provide adequate remedies for
degradation of environmental life support system and to prevent unreasonable degradation of
natural resources.”).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1246.
231. Id. The Court further held that to survive strict scrutiny, the State must “establish[] a
compelling state interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the
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intent in mind, the Court interpreted the Montana Constitution to include
expansive environmental protections meant to guarantee not only a
healthful environment, but one that was free from degradation—the
strongest possible protections that the drafters could provide for the
environment. 232
b.

Louisiana

Like Montana, Louisiana included environmental protections directly
into its Constitution when it adopted the current Constitution in 1974.
Article IX provides that:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished
insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and
welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to
implement this policy. 233
In Louisiana, the environmental protections enshrined in article IX of
the Constitution are a codification of a broad public trust doctrine. 234 The
Louisiana Supreme Court explained that in Louisiana, “[a] public trust
for the protection, conservation and replenishment of all natural
resources of the state was recognized by art. VI § 1 of the 1921
Louisiana Constitution.” 235 The court further explained that the 1974
least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State’s objective.” Id. This holding was recently
revisited in Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Montana Board of Land Commissioners, 288
P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012). In Northern Plains Resource Council, the Montana Supreme Court
reiterated that “[t]he right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right,” and that a
statute that interferes with the exercise of that right is subject to strict scrutiny, “requiring the State
to provide a compelling interest for its existence.” Id. at 174. The Court also indicated that “middletier” scrutiny is appropriate for a statute that impacts constitutional rights provided in article IX. Id.
In Northern Plains Resource Council, the Court upheld mineral development leases issued by the
State to a mining company that were entered into without an environmental review. Id. at 174–75.
The Court held that “[b]ecause the leases themselves do not allow for any degradation of the
environment, conferring only the exclusive right to apply for State permits, and because they
specifically require full environmental review and full compliance with applicable State
environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and
healthful environment in [a]rticle II, [s]ection 3 of the Montana Constitution.” Id. at 174. Similarly,
because the leases did require an environmental review before any mining could take place, the
leases did not impact rights conferred by article IX. Id. at 174–75. Because no constitutional rights
were impacted, the Court looked for a rational basis and found that there was one to defer the
environmental review until the permitting stage of a specific mining project. Id. at 175. The Court
thus upheld the leases. Id.
232. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1248.
233. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
234. In re Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (La. 1994) (noting that
article IX, section 1 “continues the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental matters”).
235. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n., 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984)
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Constitution expanded the public trust doctrine by explicitly categorizing
water and air as natural resources, and commanding the legislature to
implement policies to conserve, protect, and replenish those natural
resources “insofar as possible and consistent with health, safety and
welfare of the people.” 236 Although these protections are broad and go
beyond the scope of the traditional public trust doctrine, environmental
protection is not “an exclusive goal.” 237 Rather, there is a balancing test
weighing environmental benefits and costs against other economic and
social factors. 238
Although environmental protection is not an exclusive goal, agencies
cannot escape the constitutional mandate to try to protect the
environment as much as possible. In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana
Environmental Control Commission, 239 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that agencies that “act as the primary public trustee of natural
resources and the environment” must provide “active and affirmative
protection” of the public’s right to a safe and healthy environment. 240 In
order to ensure that this duty is met, an agency must provide a record of
decision that clearly articulates the basis for its decision. 241 The agency
must thus demonstrate that it has acted in the public’s best interest,
balancing environmental factors against the general welfare of the
people. 242
Louisiana courts have recognized that while environmental protection
is mandated by the State Constitution, it must also be balanced against
sometimes competing economic and social factors.243 However, this
balancing test does not negate the State’s duty to provide “active and
affirmative protection” of the environment. 244 Instead, the state must
clearly, and on the record, articulate the basis for its decisions when they
affect environmental quality. 245 This requirement ensures that decisionmakers execute their “duty to see that the environment would be
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1157.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1152.
240. Id. at 1157.
241. Id. at 1159–60.
242. See id. at 1157.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. Agency officials must follow the “rule of reasonableness,” which “requires an agency or
official, before granting approval of proposed action affecting the environment, to determine that
adverse environmental impacts have been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently
with the public welfare.” Id.
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protected to the fullest extent possible consistent with the health, safety
and welfare of the people” 246 and are more deliberate with their
decisions that affect the environment.
c.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania amended its Constitution in 1971 to include broad
environmental protections. 247 Article I, section 27 provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all people. 248
As discussed above, 249 Pennsylvania’s interpretation of article I, section
27 provides some of the strongest public trust constitutional protections
of natural resources in the United States. The provision is self-executing,
and “create[s] a right in the people to seek to enforce the obligations”
that the Commonwealth incurs as the trustee responsible for the
maintenance and conservation of the “public natural resources.” 250
The Commonwealth’s obligations related to this constitutional
provision were recently addressed in Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth. 251 In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
invalidated various provisions of Act 13, which aimed “to provide a
maximally favorable environment for [oil and gas] industry operators to
exploit Pennsylvania’s oil and natural gas resources, including those in
the Marcellus Shale Formation.” 252 Among other things, Act 13 required
local government “to authorize oil and gas operations, impoundment
areas, and local assessment operations . . . as permitted uses in all zoning
districts throughout a locality,” to authorize both natural gas compressor
stations and natural gas processing plants, and prohibited local
governments from imposing more stringent conditions on oil and gas

246. Id. at 1160.
247. Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution: Twenty
Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123–24 (1990).
248. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. For a detailed analysis of all of article I, section 27 of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania, and the associated case law, see Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83
A.3d 901, 951–69 (Pa. 2013).
249. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
250. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 974.
251. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
252. Id. at 975.
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operations. 253 The Act also entitled oil and gas operators “to automatic
waivers of setbacks”—meant to protect sensitive water resources—upon
submission of a plan that identified additional measures, as prescribed
by the Department of Environmental Protection, that would be utilized
during construction, drilling, and well operations. 254
The Court found that Act 13 implicated the public’s natural resources
“essential to life, health, and liberty: surface and ground water, ambient
air, and aspects of the natural environment in which the public has an
interest,” all of which are part of the public trust. 255 The Court found that
three provisions of the Act were “incompatible with the
Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources,” in violation of article I, section 27. 256 One provision
unlawfully required local governments “to ignore their obligations under
[a]rticle I, [s]ection 27” and instead required them “to take affirmative
actions to undo existing [environmental] protections.” 257 Another
provision fell short of the legislature’s constitutional duty to enact
legislation that restrains private parties from causing environmental
degradation. 258 Finally, the Court found that the third challenged
provision “fail[ed] both to ensure conservation of the quality and
quantity of the Commonwealth’s waters and to treat all beneficiaries
equitably in light of the purpose of the trust,” in violation of the
Commonwealth’s trustee duties. 259 Despite recognizing that the oil and
gas industry “offer[ed] the very real prospect of jobs and other important
economic benefits,” 260 the Court invalidated provisions of an Act that
provided more favorable conditions for the oil and gas industry because
they violated the people’s right to a clean and healthy environment.
253. Id. at 971–72. For more detail on Act 13, see id. at 969–74.
254. Id. at 973.
255. Id. at 975.
256. Id. at 985.
257. Id. at 978.
258. Id. at 979. The Court noted there were two reasons the Act violated the legislature’s duty to
restrain private parties. “First, a new regulatory regime permitting industrial uses as a matter of right
in every type of pre-existing zoning district is incapable of conserving or maintaining the
constitutionally-protected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life.” Id.
Second, the “requirement that local government permit industrial uses in all zoning districts [results
in] some properties and communities . . . carry[ing] much heavier environmental and habitability
burdens than others. This disparate effect is irreconcilable with the express command that the trustee
will manage the corpus of the trust for the benefit of ‘all the people.’” Id. at 980 (citations omitted).
It is important to note, however, that the Court did recognize that there were competing
constitutional requirements and “that sustainable development may require some degradation of the
corpus of the trust,” thus implying that a balance must sometimes be struck between environmental
protection and development. Id. at 980.
259. Id. at 984.
260. Id. at 976.
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Internationally, Countries Are Incorporating a Right to a Healthy
Environment into Their Constitutions

States in the United States are not alone in incorporating
constitutional provisions that protect the environment. Internationally,
countries have included environmental provisions in their constitutions
since 1948. 261 The 1970s marked the start of a worldwide trend in which
countries began amending their constitutions to include stronger
environmental protections. 262 As of 2012, 147 out of 193 of the world’s
constitutions—approximately
three-quarters—“include
explicit
references
to
environmental
rights
and/or
environmental
responsibilities.” 263 Countries from all regions (except North America)
and from all levels of development have these provisions. 264
Although not all countries utilize their constitutional environmental
protection provisions, 265 some countries do. This section provides just a
few examples of countries utilizing those provisions to tackle major
environmental challenges and increase government accountability. 266
a.

Argentina

Argentina revised its Constitution in 1994, and in doing so
incorporated strong environmental protections. 267 Section 41 provides
that:
All inhabitants are entitled to a healthful and balanced
environment fit for human development in order that productive
activities shall meet present needs without endangering those of
future generations; and shall have the duty to preserve it. As a
first priority, environmental damage shall bring about the
obligation to repair it according to law.
The authorities shall provide for the protection of this right, the
261. Italy was the first country to have such a provision. DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 50 (2012). A full examination of the international trend of incorporating
environmental provisions into constitutions is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a detailed
analysis of this topic, see generally BOYD, supra.
262. Id. at 3.
263. Id. at 47.
264. Id.
265. For example, although throughout Africa the right to a healthy environment is recognized,
economic, political, and social, challenges have generally prevented its effective implementation
and enforcement. Id. at 283.
266. For additional examples and a more comprehensive look at international constitutional
environmental provisions, see generally id.
267. Id. at 50.
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rational use of natural resources, the preservation of the natural
and cultural heritage and of the biological diversity, and shall
also provide for environmental information and education. 268
The Constitution further states that the national government must set the
“minimum protection standards,” and that the provinces also may pass
complementary laws to further protect the environment. 269 This
constitutional provision is the foundation of environmental law in
Argentina, and the basis of much of the environmental litigation in that
country. 270 This provision, combined with an increasingly active
judiciary (in 2007 there were 151 cases dealing with the right to a
healthy environment), has resulted in Argentina being the regional leader
“in judicial recognition and enforcement of the constitutional right to
live in a healthy environment.” 271
Argentineans have utilized their constitutional right to live in a
healthy environment to tackle major pollution in their country’s capital
city. In Beatriz Silvia Mendoza v. National Government, 272 the leading
case based on Section 41, a group of concerned citizens sued the
national and local government, the City of Buenos Aires, and forty-four
industrial facilities for polluting the Matanza-Riachuelo River. 273 The
Matanza-Riachuelo River is one of the most polluted rivers on the
continent with millions of people—many of whom are poor—living near
its banks. 274 The National Supreme Court of Justice responded to the suit
in a series of decisions. In 2006, the Court ordered the government to
conduct an environmental assessment of the river and begin an
environmental education program. 275 In 2007, the Court ordered the
government “to establish a comprehensive cleanup and restoration plan
for the river” with input and evaluation from independent experts, the
plaintiffs, non-governmental organizations, and the public. 276 The Court
issued its final comprehensive ruling in 2008 with three objectives:
“improved quality of life for the inhabitants of the basin,”
“reconstruction of the environment in the basin in all of its components,”

268. Art. 41, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
269. Id.
270. See BOYD, supra note 261, at 129.
271. Id.
272. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
8/7/2008, “Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c. Estado Nacional y otros s/ daños y prejuicios (daños
derivados de la contaminación ambiental del Río Matanza – Riachuelo),” M. 1569. XL (Arg.).
273. BOYD, supra note 261, at 129.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 130.
276. Id.
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and “prevention of injury with sufficient degree of predictability.” 277
To attain these objectives, the Court ordered that the government and
other defendants undertake a variety of actions, including “the creation
and implementation of plans for wastewater treatment,” “development of
a regional environmental health plan” with “ongoing judicial oversight
of the implementation plan,” “improvement of drinking-water, sewage
treatment, and stormwater discharge systems,” and “closure of all illegal
dumps, redevelopment of legal landfills, and cleanup of the
riverbanks.” 278 The Court based its decision on Section 41 and Section
43 (which allows citizens to “defend their rights through recourse to the
judicial system”). 279 The Court’s decision triggered the World Bank to
approve two billion U.S. dollars for the Matanza-Riachuelo Basin
Sustainable Development Project. 280 As of mid-2011, major progress
had been made toward cleaning up the river, including providing one
million people with clean drinking water and half a million people with a
new sewage system; the closure of 167 polluting companies and 134
garbage dumps; and “the creation of 139 sampling points for monitoring
water, air, and soil quality.” 281 As of 2014, more than 1500 polluting
enterprises are being continuously monitored “to track progress in
reducing industrial pollution.” 282 In addition, the contracts for civil
works related to the project have been signed, and construction is
expected to begin in 2015. 283
Argentina is the Latin American leader in relying on its constitutional
amendment to ensure that individuals live in a healthy environment. 284
Utilizing their constitutional rights, community members from one of the
poorest and most polluted areas of Buenos Aires were able to sue the
government and begin tackling one of the country’s worst environmental
problems.

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 131; see also Art. 43, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
BOYD, supra note 261, at 131.
Id.
THE WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION STATUS & RESULTS: ARGENTINA MATANZARIACHUELO BASIN (MRB) SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ADAPTABLE LENDING PROGRAM
(P105680)
(2014),
available
at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/LCR/2014/06/16/090224b0825031f0/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Argentina000
Ma0Report000Sequence009.pdf.
283. Id.
284. See BOYD, supra note 261, at 129.
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South Africa

South Africa included a right to a healthy environment in its 1996
Constitution. 285 Article XXIV declares that:
Everyone has the right—
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or
wellbeing; and
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other
measures that—
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and
social development. 286
The Constitutional Court has interpreted this provision as imposing a
trusteeship position on the current generation. 287 This position requires
the current generation to protect the Earth for future generations. 288 The
court is responsible for making sure that the current generation fulfills its
obligation to future generations. 289
In addition to recognizing its own role in protecting the environment,
the Court “observed that the protection of the right to a healthy
environment will depend not only on the diligence of public officials but
also on the active participation of civil society and, in some cases, on
public interest litigation.” 290 To foster public interest litigation—like that
protecting the environment—the Constitutional Court held that
unsuccessful plaintiffs are exempt from reimbursing their opponents’
legal costs. 291
Perhaps most striking, the constitutional right to a healthy
environment has had a major impact on legislation in South Africa. The
1996 Constitution resulted in a “complete overhaul” of South Africa’s
environmental law, resulting in the National Environmental
285. Id. at 50, 151.
286. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
287. BOYD, supra note 261, at 153 (“[T]he present generation holds the Earth in trust for the next
generation. This trusteeship position carries with it the responsibility to look after the environment.
It is the duty of the court to ensure that this responsibility is carried out.” (quoting Fuel Retailers
Ass’n of S. Afr. v. Director-General: Envtl. Mgmt., Dep’t of Agric., Conservation and Env’t,
Mpumalanga Province 2007 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para. 102 (S. Afr.)).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (citing Biowatch Trust v. Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) (S. Afr.)).
291. Id.
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Management Act. 292 The preamble of the Act states that the Act’s
purpose is “to provide for co-operative, environmental governance by
establishing principles for decision-making on matters affecting the
environment, institutions that will promote co-operative governance and
procedures for co-ordinating environmental functions exercised by
organs of state; and to provide for matters connected therewith.” 293 The
first and second paragraph of the preamble recognize that many people
living in South Africa live in an unhealthy environment, 294 but that
“everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to his or
her health or well-being.” 295 The preamble continues, explaining that
both present and future generations have the right to have the
environment protected via legislation and other means. 296 To reach this
end, the Act establishes—among other provisions—management
principles, which reiterate the importance and centrality of
environmental protection and management to protect people; 297 and
enforcement/compliance mechanisms which include the right to
information, 298 protection for whistleblowers, 299 and standing for
individuals suing to enforce environmental laws. 300
In addition to the National Environmental Management Act, other
legislation addressing air quality, water, biodiversity, and local
governments also include a right to a healthy environment. 301 South
Africa’s strong environmental laws and constitutional protection of the
environment “represents a beacon of hope” in the movement toward
greater environmental protection in Africa. 302
c.

Philippines

Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution of the Philippines provides
that “[t]he State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
292. Id. at 149; National Environmental Management Act 19519 of 1998 (S. Afr.), available at
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/nema_amendment_act107.pdf.
293. National Environmental Management Act 19519. Professor Boyd explains that the Act
“repeatedly refers to the right to a healthy environment.” BOYD, supra note 261, at 149.
294. National Environmental Management Act 19519 (recognizing “many inhabitants of South
Africa live in an environment that is harmful to their health and well-being”).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. § 2.
298. Id. § 31(1).
299. Id. § 31(4), (8).
300. Id. §§ 32–33.
301. BOYD, supra note 261, at 149–50.
302. Id. at 160.
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balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.” 303 This provision was enacted as part of the present 1987
Constitution. 304 In 1993, the Supreme Court of the Philippines decided
the first precedent-setting case implicating this provision. In Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., 305 a lawsuit was “filed on behalf of children and future
generations” with the goal of cancelling all timber-harvesting licenses in
the country. 306 The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that the right
to a healthful ecology was self-executing, and pressed the “urgent need
to protect the environment on behalf of both present and future
generations.” 307
In 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay 308 decision, which was aimed at cleaning up Manila Bay. 309
The Court held that “different government agencies and instrumentalities
cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic
functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay.” 310 To
effectuate this order, the Court required that within six months a dozen
government agencies had “to develop a comprehensive plan . . . to
rehabilitate and restore Manila Bay.” 311 Specifically, the Court ordered
the agencies to perform specific actions including the clean-up of toxic
and hazardous waste, the development of facilities and programs for
disposal of solid waste, the reintroduction of indigenous aquatic species,
and the development of an environmental education program. 312
Responsible agencies were required to “allocate a budget sufficient to

303. CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 16 (Phil.).
304. BOYD, supra note 261, at 167; Philippine Constitutions, OFFICIAL GAZETTE,
http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
305. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
306. BOYD, supra note 261, at 167. Although Minors Oposa did not result in the cancellation of
all timber-harvesting licenses, when the case was filed there were ninety-two licenses in the
Philippines, but “by 2006, there were only three, and the rate of deforestation had fallen.” Id.
Furthermore, in a case brought by a timber company, “the Supreme Court upheld the government’s
ability to cancel licenses, based in part on the Minors Oposa precedent.” Id.
307. Id.
308. Metro. Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48
(S.C., Dec. 18, 2008) (Phil.), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/
december2008/171947-48.htm.
309. BOYD, supra note 261, at 168.
310. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, at 23; see also BOYD, supra note
261, at 168.
311. BOYD, supra note 261, at 168.
312. See Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, at 24–27; BOYD, supra note
261, at 168–69.
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carry out the restoration plan.” 313 To ensure that its order was actually
carried out, the Court has continuing mandamus, “the power to supervise
implementation of the restoration plan,” and government agencies must
submit quarterly reports that are reviewed by a court-established expert
committee. 314 This case demonstrates that the right to a healthy
environment is used as a powerful tool, and creates real responsibilities
for the state. The Court held that “the responsible government agencies
‘cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep
the waters of the Manila Bay as clean and clear as humanly possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.’” 315 The
government has allocated approximately one hundred million U.S.
dollars to begin clean-up of the Bay. 316
In addition to these groundbreaking cases, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines designated 117 courts as “green courts,” which would be
headed by judges that are specially trained to deal with violations of
environmental law. 317 In 2010 the Supreme Court of the Philippines
issued specific procedural rules applicable to environmental cases. 318
The rules had four objectives: “protecting and advancing the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; providing a
simplified, speedy, and inexpensive procedure for enforcing
environmental rights; adopting innovations and best practices for
enforcing environmental laws; and enabling courts to monitor and
ensure compliance with orders in environmental cases.” 319 In addition,
the Supreme Court created the writ of kalikasan (nature)—a type of civil
action that allowed any natural or legal person to bring a case that would
result in the court ordering a respondent “to cease an environmentally
harmful activity; protect the environment; or carry out restoration or
rehabilitation activities.” 320 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
environmental protections enshrined in the Constitution has led to strong
environmental decisions and procedural maneuvers to help ensure that
313. BOYD, supra note 261, at 169.
314. Id.; see also Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, at 27.
315. BOYD, supra note 261, at 169 (quoting Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, at 23).
316. Id.
317. Id. (citing Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2008, Resolution A.M. No. 07-11-12,
authorized by CONST. (1987), art. VIII, § 5 (Phil.)); Julie M. Aurelio, Environmentalists Hail
Creation of ‘Green’ Court, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (Jan. 27, 2008), available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080127-115049/Environmentalistshail-creation-of-green-court.
318. BOYD, supra note 261, at 169.
319. Id. (citing Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (2010)).
320. Id.
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the constitutional mandate is satisfied.
Countries around the world have included provisions enshrining a
right to a healthy environment in their constitutions. As the examples in
this section show, these amendments are not just rhetoric—they can and
have been used to tackle serious environmental challenges and foster
real environmental change. Although the United States has not included
this right in the Constitution, 321 numerous states have. This right has, at
least in some states, also been used to foster environmental change and
address serious environmental problems. Washington should follow the
national and international trend and amend its Constitution to include an
explicit, positive right to a healthy environment.
II.

AMENDING THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION IS
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS WASHINGTON’S
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND TO PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT FOR THIS AND FUTURE GENERATIONS

Not only would a constitutional amendment be in line with existing
Washington mores, and national and international trends, it is necessary
to secure a healthy environment in Washington. This Part, which
explains why an amendment is necessary, proceeds in two sections. The
first demonstrates that despite Washington’s apparently strong
environmental legislation, the state faces significant air, water, and soil
pollution, indicating that existing laws are not doing enough. 322 The
second explains that a constitutional amendment is the necessary
mechanism to address the state’s environmental challenges because an
amendment will enshrine an otherwise weak and vulnerable common
law, give individuals a private right of action, give the courts a
constitutional hook to require private and state action, and send a strong
signal to the legislature that it must prioritize the environment. 323
A.

Despite Legislative Efforts, Washington Is Facing Pervasive and
Costly Environmental Problems
Washington’s legislature has passed a variety of strong-sounding

321. At least one scholar argues that substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments could be used to recognize a right to a healthy environment in the federal
Constitution. See generally Janelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment:
Enforcing Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 185 (2001). However, there is currently no explicit right to a healthy environment in the
Constitution of the United States.
322. See infra Part II.A.
323. See infra Part II.B.
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legislation that is meant to address pollution in the state. 324 For example,
the legislature has declared that:
Each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a
healthful environment, and each person has a responsibility to
preserve and enhance that right. The beneficial stewardship of
the land, air, and waters of the state is a solemn obligation of the
present generation for the benefit of future generations. 325
Although the language and sentiment are encouraging, the reality is
that all Washingtonians do not live in a healthy environment. Despite the
legislature’s lofty ambition, Washington continues to face serious air,
water, and soil pollution that negatively affects the health and welfare of
Washingtonians.
1.

Air Pollution Poses an Ongoing Challenge to Health and the
Economy

The Washington State Legislature has attempted to address air
pollution. 326 In passing the Washington Clean Air Act 327 the legislature
declared that it is
the public policy to preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality
for current and future generations. Air is an essential resource
that must be protected from harmful levels of pollution. . . . It is
the intent of this chapter to secure and maintain levels of air
quality that protect human health and safety . . .[,] to prevent
injury to plant, animal life, and property, to foster the comfort
and convenience of Washington’s inhabitants, to promote the
economic and social development of the state, and to facilitate
the enjoyment of the natural attractions of the state. 328
To realize this sweeping goal, the legislature explicitly stated that, “it is
the intent of this chapter to prevent any areas of the state with acceptable
air quality from reaching air contaminant levels that are not protective of
human health and the environment.” 329 The legislature has failed to
324. A full review of all of the environmental laws that have a protectionist aspect is beyond the
scope of this Comment. The following examples are merely exemplary of the fact that the
legislature has passed legislation with the goal of eliminating a particular type of pollution, and that
those goals have not been met.
325. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.010 (2014).
326. A full review of the legislature’s actions to prevent air pollution is beyond the scope of this
Comment. The example provided is meant to illustrate that the legislature has taken action, and that
the action has failed to reduce air pollution to a level where human health is not negatively affected.
327. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.94.011–70.94.990.
328. Id. § 70.94.011.
329. Id. The statute also states that, “[t]he legislature recognizes that the problems and effects of
air pollution cross political boundaries, are frequently regional or interjurisdictional in nature, and
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achieve this goal, and air pollution continues to have negative health
impacts on the residents of Washington.
Air pollution can cause lung disease, and it makes existing lung and
heart disease worse. 330 It is also associated with cancer. 331 In 2009, the
Washington State Department of Ecology estimated that fine particulate
pollution contributed to 1500 nonfatal heart attacks, 1900 incidents of
acute bronchitis, and thousands of cases of worsened asthma annually. 332
Overall, the direct and indirect costs of these air pollution-related
diseases are about $190 million per year. 333
The main sources of air pollution in Washington—wood smoke,
motor vehicles, and outdoor burning 334—come from within the state’s
own borders. 335 Each one of these sources of pollution brings health
risks to Washingtonians and the environment. For example, air pollution
from motor vehicles can trigger asthma, and is linked to heart attacks
and cancer. 336 More than a third of Washingtonians “are in an age group
are dependent upon the existence of human activity in areas having common topography and
weather conditions conducive to the buildup of air contaminants.” Id. While the legislature clearly
recognizes that air pollution within Washington is not completely within the State’s control, this
statement does not negate that it is the policy of the State to reduce air pollution to levels where it is
not harmful.
330. Air Quality, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF WASH., http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/air/
airhome.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
331. Id.
332. AIR QUALITY PROGRAM, WASH. STATE DEP’T ECOLOGY, HEALTH EFFECTS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF FINE PARTICLE POLLUTION IN WASHINGTON 3 (2009), available at
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/0902021.pdf.
333. Id.
334. Air Quality, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF WASH., http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/air/
airhome.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
335. See Air Quality: Motor Vehicles, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF WASH.,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/air/cars/automotive_pages.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2014)
(“Motor vehicles are one of the main sources of air pollution in Washington.”); Air Quality:
OF
ECOLOGY,
ST.
OF
WASH.,
Outdoor
Burning
(Non-Agricultural),
DEP’T
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/air/outdoor_woodsmoke/residentialburn.htm (last visited Dec. 12,
2014) (“[B]urning of household yard waste . . . and burning to clear land” is regulated by
Washington State’s Department of Ecology); Air Quality: Wood Stoves, Fireplaces, Pellet Stoves
OF
ECOLOGY,
ST.
OF
WASH.,
and
Masonry
Heaters,
DEP’T
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/air/indoor_
woodsmoke/wood_smoke_page.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2014) (“Wood smoke is one of the main
sources of air pollution in Washington.”). The fact that the main sources of air pollution are small
sources is particularly striking since Washington’s Clean Air Act specifically “recognizes that air
emissions from thousands of small individual sources are major contributors to air pollution in
many regions of the state. As the population of a region grows, small sources may contribute an
increasing proportion of that region’s total air emissions. It is declared to be the policy of the state to
achieve significant reductions in emissions from those small sources whose aggregate emissions
constitute a significant contribution to air pollution in a particular region.” WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.94.011 (2014).
336. Air Quality: Motor Vehicles, supra note 335.
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that is at risk for health problems from this pollution, or have at least one
medical condition that is made worse by it.” 337
Wood smoke from fireplaces, stoves, and other wood burning devices
is also particularly dangerous to human health, releasing fine
particulates, many of which are toxic. 338 These tiny particles are so small
that they can go deep into the lungs, scarring the lung tissue. 339 Studies
have shown that in some cities, death rates increased “when there were
higher levels of fine particles in the air. Wood smoke is most dangerous
to the health of infants and children, pregnant women, the elderly, and
people with lung or heart disease.” 340 Indeed, “children in wood burning
neighborhoods are more likely to have lung and breathing problems.” 341
Wood smoke is a particularly serious problem in Washington because
almost all of it is released during winter. 342 Winter weather conditions
cause stagnant air, which traps smoke close to the ground, 343 making
many neighborhoods unhealthy. 344
Air pollution is not only damaging to human health, but it is also
extremely harmful for the environment. Cars and other transportationrelated sources of air pollution “produce nearly half of the greenhouse
gas emissions” in Washington. 345 As the Washington State Department
of Ecology explains, “[g]reenhouse gases cause climate change. Effects
of climate change in Washington include reduced snow pack, low
summer stream flows, more winter flooding, increased coastal erosion,
reduced water supplies for people and agriculture, and further loss of
salmon habitat.” 346 These environmental consequences are not only

337. Id.
338. Air Quality: Wood Stoves, Fireplaces, Pellet Stoves and Masonry Heaters, supra note 335.
339. Id. There is no “cure” for pulmonary fibrosis (scarring of the lungs)—treatment aims to
prevent more scarring, but it cannot fix existing scarring. Symptoms, Diagnosis and Treatment, AM.
LUNG ASS’N, http://www.lung.org/lung-disease/pulmonary-fibrosis/symptoms-diagnosis.html (last
visited Dec. 12, 2014). Symptoms of pulmonary fibrosis include: hacking, dry cough; shortness of
breath; shallow and fast breathing; tiredness; unintended gradual weight loss; aching muscles and
joints; and a “widening and rounding of the tips of the fingers or toes” (clubbing). Id.
340. Air Quality: Wood Stoves, Fireplaces, Pellet Stoves and Masonry Heaters, supra note 335.
341. Id.
342. Id. During winter, wood smoke is the state’s third largest source of air pollution. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Air Quality: Motor Vehicles, supra note 335.
346. Id. It should be noted that in 2008 the Legislature passed legislation reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by 2020, with continuing reductions through 2050. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.235.020
(2014); Climate Change, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF WASH., http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
climatechange/ghg_reducing.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2015). In addition, both former Governor
Gregoire and current Governor Inslee signed executive orders aimed at reducing carbon and
greenhouse gas pollution. Id. The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen.
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damaging to species like salmon, but they have a serious and negative
effect on future human health. The decrease in the snowpack and earlier
snowmelt will lead to increased water shortages. 347 Because of climate
change, approximately sixty-seven percent of Washingtonians “now face
a higher risk of water shortages by mid-century.” 348 Furthermore,
“[c]limate change will worsen smog and cause[] plants to produce more
pollen pollution, increasing respiratory health threats.” 349
In sum, Washington’s aspirational goal of providing clean air that is
healthy for both people and nature has not been met. The legislature’s
language, while expressing the strong environmental protection ethos of
the state, is not enough to actually provide a healthy environment. A
constitutional amendment is necessary to bridge the gap between
rhetoric and reality.
2.

Ocean Acidification and Rising Temperatures are Negatively
Affecting Washington’s Natural Resources

In 1971, before the catastrophic effects of ocean acidification were
recognized, the Washington Legislature passed the Shoreline
Management Act, 350 pledging to protect the shorelines and their natural
resources. The Act was passed after a legislative finding “that the
shorelines of the state are among the most valuable and fragile of its
natural resources and that there is great concern throughout the state
relating to their utilization, protection, restoration, and preservation.” 351
To realize this goal, when adopting shoreline development guidelines
that have a statewide effect, the Department of Ecology is required to
give preference to the following seven uses in the following order:
(1) Recognize and protect the statewide interest over local
interest;
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline;
(3) Result in long term over short term benefit;
(4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline;
(5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the
347. Climate Change Health Threats in Washington, NAT’L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL,
http://www.nrdc.org/health/climate/wa.asp#airpollution (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.010–90.58.920 (2014) (Chapter 90.58 is entitled Shoreline
Management Act of 1971). A full review of the Legislature’s actions to prevent ocean pollution is
beyond the scope of this Comment. The examples provided are meant to illustrate that the
Legislature has taken action, and that the action has failed to adequately protect the state’s ocean
shoreline.
351. Id. § 90.58.020.
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shorelines;
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the
shoreline;
(7) Provide for any other element as defined in RCW 90.58.100
deemed appropriate or necessary. 352
The recent oyster die-offs 353 and the continuing ocean acidification 354
demonstrate that the legislature has not met its goal of protecting the
ecology of the shoreline—the fourth required use of the shorelines.
The Legislature has taken one step in response to the challenges of
ocean acidification. In 2013 the State Legislature passed Engrossed
Senate Bill 5603. 355 Section 4 of this legislation establishes the Marine
Resources Advisory Council. 356 In addition to providing a forum for
discussion around ocean acidification and its attendant problems, 357 the
Council provides recommendations to the governor, local agencies, and
the legislature on coastal waters issues. 358 The effectiveness of this
Council remains to be seen.
What is known is that up to this point, the state has failed (and is
failing) to protect its citizens and natural resources from ocean
acidification, with devastating consequences. One of the leading causes
of ocean acidification is atmospheric carbon dioxide. 359 Changes in land
use, in combination with the burning of fossil fuels, has resulted in
massive quantities of carbon dioxide being released into the earth’s
atmosphere. 360 The ocean has absorbed approximately one-quarter of
anthropogenic carbon dioxide. This has caused ocean acidification, or
the decrease in upper-oceans pH. 361
This acidification is particularly damaging for Washington given the

352. Id. (emphasis added).
353. Elizabeth Grossman, Northwest Oyster Die-Offs Show Ocean Acidification Has Arrived,
YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 21, 2011), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/northwest_oyster_dieoffs_show_ocean_acidification_has_arrived/2466/.
354. See infra notes 359–369 and accompanying text.
355. Ocean Acidification and Washington State, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF WASH.,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015); Engrossed
S. 5603, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).
356. Wash. Engrossed S. 5603 § 4.
357. Id. § 2(2)(c).
358. Id. § 2(2)(f).
359. WASH. SHELLFISH INITIATIVE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, SCIENTIFIC
SUMMARY OF OCEAN ACIDIFICATION IN WASHINGTON STATE MARINE WATERS, at xi (Nov. 2012),
available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/1201016.pdf [hereinafter BLUE
RIBBON SUMMARY].
360. Id.
361. Id.
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state’s location and geography. 362 In addition to atmospheric carbon
dioxide, “acidification in Washington State coastal waters is driven by a
combination of factors, particularly in the deep waters of Puget Sound
and the nearshore regions that are so important to Washington’s shellfish
industry.” 363 These factors include an increase in nutrients like nitrogen,
phosphorus, and silicate in Washington waters caused, in part, by
fertilizer runoff and erosion. 364 These nutrients can lead to algae blooms,
which, when they die, drive down pH levels in deeper waters and are
indicated by incidences of coastal hypoxia (very low oxygen levels). 365
Nutrients in animal waste runoff from large farms can also cause algal
blooms, leading to acidification. 366 Large factory farms also emit
greenhouse gases, which contribute to climate change 367 and its
attendant negative effects on water quality. In addition, burning fossil
fuels releases gases like nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides, which form
acids when dissolved in seawater. 368 Finally, industrial wastes that are
deposited directly into marine waters can be acidic.369
Ocean acidification is a huge problem for Washington State, and the
effects can already be felt. The recent oyster die-offs along the
Washington coast were a result of ocean acidification. 370 Other species
that have cultural and economic importance to Washington and have
negative reactions to ocean acidification include clams and mussels. 371
In addition, marine fish species have shown changes in behavior,
survivorship, and growth in response to ocean acidification. 372 Ocean
acidification is threatening Washington’s marine species and
consequently the state’s economy. 373 Washington is the nation’s largest
provider of farmed oysters, mussels, and clams. 374 The industry supports
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at xii.
365. Id.
366. Facts About Pollution from Livestock Farms, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL,
http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/ffarms.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
367. CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 7 (2010),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf.
368. BLUE RIBBON SUMMARY, supra note 359, at xii.
369. Id.
370. Grossman, supra note 353.
371. BLUE RIBBON SUMMARY, supra note 359, at xii.
372. Id.
373. WASH. OCEAN ACIDIFICATION CENTER, FOCUSED ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION IMPACTS AND
ADAPTATION IN WASHINGTON 1 (2013), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/
20131121workplan.pdf.
374. Id.
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3200 jobs, and generates $270 million annually. 375 Local coastal
economies also benefit greatly from the recreational harvests of clams
and oysters. 376 Tribes also “depend upon shellfish for food, income and
connection to their cultural heritage.” 377 Washington’s seafood
industry—which could be threatened by changes to marine food webs—
is also a major contributor to the state economy, generating a gross of at
least $1.7 billion, and providing over 42,000 jobs. 378 Ocean acidification
could threaten not only Washington’s natural marine resources, but also
its economy and culture.
In addition to ocean acidification, climate change is increasing, or will
increase, water temperatures in streams, lakes, and rivers. 379 Rising
temperatures will have a particularly large impact on cold-water fish,
like salmon. 380 The United States Global Change Research Program
predicts that up to forty percent of Pacific Northwest salmon could be
lost by the year 2050. 381 The loss of the salmon would be particularly
devastating in Washington, where salmon is a source of food,
employment, and recreation, and plays a central role in culture and
tradition. 382
3.

Washington’s Land/Soil Is Polluted, Increasing the Potential for
Serious Health Risks

Washington has also passed environmental legislation that sounded
promising in its potential for protecting the state’s land and soil. The
Model Toxics Control Act 383 was passed as a voter initiative in
November 1988, and became effective in 1989. 384 The “main
purpose . . . is to raise sufficient funds to clean up all hazardous waste
sites and to prevent the creation of future hazards due to improper
disposal of toxic wastes into the state’s land and waters.” 385 Twenty-five
375. Id.
376. Id. Coastal economies receive more than twenty-seven million dollars annually from the
recreational harvests of these species. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Craig, supra note 42, at 793.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Salmon Recovery in Washington, WASH. ST. RECREATION & CONSERVATION OFFICE,
http://www.rco.wa.gov/salmon_recovery/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
383. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.105D.010–70.105D.921 (2014).
384. Id. § 70.105D.920.
385. Id. § 70.105D.010 (emphasis added). Generally, hazardous substance has a broad definition,
including that of hazardous waste, which is “any discarded, useless, unwanted, or abandoned
substances . . . which are disposed of in such quantity or concentration as to pose a substantial
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years later, not only is hazardous waste still a continuing problem in
Washington, but new sources of hazardous waste are adding pollution to
the state’s soils.
There are approximately 677,000 acres in the state of Washington that
are classified as being affected by area-wide soil contamination. 386 These
contaminated areas are affected by low- to moderate-level soil
contamination, which generally have arsenic and lead levels that are
higher than levels established under the Model Toxics Control Act and
higher than naturally occurring amounts. 387 The cause of this
contamination is often historic, including contamination from metal
smelting operations, the “use of lead-arsenate pesticides,” and leaded
gasoline. 388 However, present-day sources of soil-polluting arsenic
include “wood treated with chromated copper arsenic (often called
‘pressure-treated’ wood), emissions from coal-fired power plants and
incinerators, and other industrial processes.” 389 There are numerous
present-day sources of lead that pollute the soil, including “lead-based
paint, lead-soldered water pipes, home remedies or health-care products
that contain lead, hobbies that use lead (e.g., staining glass or
sculpturing), food and beverages, combustion of coal or oil, waste
incinerators, and mining and industrial processes (such as battery and
ammunitions manufacturing).” 390
Both lead and arsenic have negative health implications for children
and adults. Although in general the amount of arsenic found in
Washington’s soils is too low to cause serious effects after short-term
exposure, 391 long-term exposure to amounts that can be found in the
environment can have serious health effects. Multiple types of cancer—
present or potential hazard to human health, wildlife, or the environment because such wastes: (a)
Have short-lived, toxic properties that may cause death, injury, or illness or have mutagenic,
teratogenic, or carcinogenic properties; or (b) are corrosive, explosive, flammable, or may generate
pressure through decomposition or other means.” Id. § 70.105.010(1); see also id.
§ 70.105D.020(13)(a).
386. Toxics Cleanup Program: Areawide Soil Contamination Project, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF
WASH., available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/tcp/area_wide/AW/toolbox_chap1.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Toxics Cleanup Program].
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. “Swallowing relatively large amounts of arsenic (even just one time) can cause mild
symptoms, serious illness, or death. Milder effects may include swelling of the face, nausea,
vomiting, stomach pain, or diarrhea. Serious effects may include coma, internal bleeding, or nerve
damage causing weakness or loss of sensation in the hands, arms, feet, or legs. Levels of arsenic in
Washington’s soil and water are generally too low to cause health effects from short-term
exposure.” Arsenic, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.doh.wa.gov/Communityand
Environment/Contaminants/Arsenic.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
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including lung, bladder, non-melanoma skin, liver, and kidney—as well
as cardiovascular disease, damage to peripheral nerves, and diabetes
mellitus, are strongly linked to long-term arsenic ingestion. 392 Even if
other factors, like genetics, may have a stronger role in the development
of these diseases than arsenic, “arsenic can increase the risk of
developing these illnesses and is likely to contribute to some of the
cases.” 393 In Washington, environmental exposure is most likely to result
in a small increased risk in the development of some types of cancer. 394
Children and adults can be exposed to lead through the air, food,
water, and soil. 395 Exposure can “damage the nervous system, kidneys,
and reproductive system.” 396 Lead exposure can have serious
consequences for both children and adults. In children, it can result in
behavioral problems, learning difficulties, and diminished growth. 397 “In
adults, lead can increase blood pressure, affect memory, and contribute
to other health problems.” 398 The toxins that pollute Washington’s soil
can have serious health consequences for Washingtonians of all ages.
In sum, despite Washington’s legislative efforts and ambitious goals,
the state continues to face serious pollution problems, which can have
negative effects on human health and the economy. Air pollution and the
attendant respiratory problems cost the state millions of dollars per year.
Ocean and air pollution, and the attendant changes in pH, are warming
the waters and creating an aquatic environment that is inhospitable to
shellfish and salmon. Continuing exposure to lead and arsenic in the soil
increases the chances of serious disease, and can cause additional mental
and behavioral problems. The legislature has passed legislation to
address each of these areas of pollution, and yet, despite its lofty and
admirable goals, the pollution persists. Although Washington cannot
solve all of its environmental challenges alone—many of them are
affected by outside causes and sources—it must do its part in the fight
against pollution. The pervasive and difficult nature of these problems
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id.
Id.
Id.
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, DIV. OF TOXICOLOGY & HUMAN
HEALTH SCIS., CAS NO. 7439-92-1, LEAD – TOXFAQS (2007), available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tfacts13.pdf (explaining that both children and adults can be
exposed to lead by “breathing workplace air or dust, eating contaminated foods . . . drinking
contaminated water . . . [or by] playing in contaminated soil”).
396. Id.
397. Toxics Cleanup Program: Health Effects of Arsenic and Lead, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF
WASH., available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/tcp/sites_brochure/dirt_alert/2011/healtheffects.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
398. Id.
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indicates that these challenges need to be given higher priority through a
constitutional amendment.
B.

Amending the Washington State Constitution Is Necessary to
Address These Environmental Challenges

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include an expanded
public trust doctrine that codifies a positive right to a healthy
environment is necessary to address the state’s ongoing environmental
challenges. As demonstrated above, despite their ambitious language,
legislative measures have not been successful in protecting the
environment. Elevating environmental protection to the constitutional
level will provide the necessary political clout and technical means to
ensure that the citizens of Washington are able to live in a healthy
environment, or at least legally fight for one. 399
1.

The Current Codified Public Trust Doctrine Is Too Narrow to
Fully Protect the Environment

As it is currently interpreted, Washington’s public trust doctrine does
not adequately protect a wide range of natural environments and
resources. 400 Indeed, at least some scholars have argued that the public
trust doctrine has “made little difference in citizen rights and the
availability of legal remedies in the State of Washington.”401 Although
the narrow, traditional public trust doctrine 402 is codified in the State
Constitution, 403 a broad public trust doctrine that protects all elements of
the environment—not just those connected to navigable waters—is not.
Expanding and codifying a public trust doctrine that reaches all elements
of the environment, including the land and the air, would provide greater
protection for all aspects of an interconnected environment. 404
399. Amending the Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment that provides a
private right of action would give individual citizens a chance to address specific pollution
problems. See generally Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, No. 69720-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124 (Wash. Ct.
App. Dec. 16, 2013). The amendment that this Comment is proposing will be self-executing,
meaning that it will not need any legislative action to become functional. Like the right to
education, the proposed amendment would provide a private right of action.
400. Bodi, supra note 73, at 645.
401. Id.
402. The traditional public trust doctrine provides for state ownership and protection of just
navigable waters and their beds and shorelands. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; see also supra Part
I.B.1.
403. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; see also supra Part I.B.1.
404. The Washington State Supreme Court recognized that some states have extended the public
trust doctrine beyond resources connected to navigable waters because modern science identified a
public need beyond navigable waters. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641 & n.10, 747
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An Expanded Common Law Public Trust Doctrine Is Not Sufficient
Because Its Uses Are Limited and It Is Inherently Vulnerable to
Erosion

Even if the public trust doctrine were to be expanded under common
law, such an expansion would not adequately protect the environment.
As a recent Washington case, Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State,405
demonstrates, the common law public trust doctrine cannot be the basis
of a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief based on state inaction.406 In
Svitak, a group of minor children and their guardians filed a complaint
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Washington and
various government officials, alleging “that under the public trust
doctrine, the atmosphere is a public trust resource, and the State has an
affirmative fiduciary duty as its trustee to preserve and protect the
atmosphere from global warming for the benefit of present and future
generations.” 407 The complaint did not allege a failure of any specific
law or constitutional provision. 408
The court dismissed the action for two reasons. First, the court found
that it was a political question, and thus was not appropriate for the court
to decide. 409 Second, “the issue is not justiciable as there is no allegation
of violation of a specific statute or constitution.” 410 The court found that
there was no actual dispute because the plaintiffs did not identify any
constitutional provision that would have been “violated by state
inaction.” 411 Environmental problems are often the result of state
inaction, 412 and injunctive and declaratory relief can be powerful tools
used to protect the environment. 413 Amending the Washington State
P.2d 1062, 1073 & n.10 (1987). Scholars have also recognized the importance of applying the
public trust doctrine to all natural resources—not just those related to navigable waters—due to the
interconnected nature of the environment. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 7, at 83–84.
405. No. 69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013).
406. Id.
407. Id. at *1.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at *2.
412. See, e.g., Michael J. Cohen, Hazard’s Toll: The Costs of Inaction at the Salton Sea, PAC.
INST. (Sept. 2014), available at http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2014/09/PacInst_
HazardsToll.pdf (detailing the negative effects and costs—environmental, monetary, and healthrelated—of state inaction on the Salton Sea in California).
413. Benjamin I. Narodick, Legal Update, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council: Going
into the Belly of the Whole of Preliminary Injunctions and Environmental Law, 15 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 332, 335 (2009) (“[L]itigants filing claims under environmental law often seek preliminary
injunctions or other declaratory relief.”). Although Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
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Constitution to provide a broader codified public trust doctrine and an
affirmative right to a healthy environment would provide the legal,
constitutional basis necessary to sustain this type of otherwise
nonjusticiable suit. 414
Furthermore, as a common law doctrine alone, the public trust
doctrine is limited in what it can achieve. 415 Generally, the common law
develops slowly, in reaction to case-specific circumstances. 416 Not only
does the common law public trust doctrine fail to support claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief, 417 it is subject to the political will of the
legislature, 418 which can erode the doctrine at any time or refuse to act in
favor of environmental protection. Furthermore, courts can either refuse
to expand the doctrine 419 or, if they want to, find that they cannot. The
common law nature of the public trust doctrine curtails the courts’
ability “[t]o create and impose [a] new duty, [which] would necessarily
involve resolution of complex social, economic, and environmental
issues.” 420 Indeed, courts have recognized that under the common law
they are constrained from creating programs to protect the environment
by the separation of powers doctrine. 421 The establishment of programs
555 U.S. 7 (2008), scaled back equitable relief, Narodick, supra at 344, plaintiffs can and do still
seek injunctive relief in environmental cases. See Eric J. Murdock & Andrew J. Turner, How
“Extraordinary” Is Injunctive Relief in Environmental Litigation? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10464, 10473 (2012).
414. Because the amendment is still a hypothetical, it is unclear how its contours would develop.
It is possible that the courts, through common law, would determine how the amendment may be
utilized and the extent of its protections. On the other hand, it is equally likely that the legislature
would play an integral role in determining the meaning of “healthy.” Or, like the right to education,
the contours of the amendment may be determined by both the legislature and the courts. Cf.
McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 483–84, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (2012) (indicating that both the
legislature and the court shape the right to education). Because this Comment is meant primarily as
an introduction to the idea of an amendment giving the people the right to a healthy environment, a
discussion of how that amendment, if adopted, may develop, is outside its scope.
415. See Klass, supra note 31, at 712.
416. Id. at 713. But see Wood, supra note 7, at 78 (arguing that the flexibility of the common law
public trust doctrine is a “great strength[]” and that “[i]n the face of climate crisis, which presents an
urgency to which the political branches have not responded, the common law’s adaptability to new
situations may prove crucial”).
417. Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, No. 69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124f, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 16, 2013).
418. See Ralph W. Johnson, Protection of Biodiversity Under the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 21, 29 (1994). But see Wood, supra note 7, at 75–77 (arguing that judges could exercise
a powerful public trust “veto” which would allow the court to invalidate “[l]egislative acts
inconsistent with the trust,” but recognizing that “[m]any courts . . . stay their hand” and grant
deference to the legislature).
419. See Klass, supra note 31, at 712.
420. Svitak ex rel. Svitak, 2013 WL 6632124f, at *2.
421. Id. (“Courts have recognized that creation of [programs to protect the environment] under
the common law is inappropriate because it invades the prerogatives of the legislative branch,
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that have broad social and economic implications is generally the
prerogative of the legislative branch. 422 Because there is no
constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment, the courts’
hands are tied where the legislature has either refused to act or has not
gone far enough. Amending the Constitution to include a broad public
trust doctrine that clearly states the public has a right to a healthy
environment would give the courts the constitutional hook necessary to
force state (or private party) action. 423
3.

An Amendment Would Provide the Necessary Constitutional Hook
for Courts and Impose Duties on the State and Its Agencies

The amendment that this Comment suggests would, in many ways, be
analogous to the right to education enshrined in article IX, section 1 of
the Washington State Constitution in that it would provide the courts
with a constitutional hook that would allow them to step into an area of
law that is traditionally within the purview of the legislature. In the
context of education, the Court is monitoring the legislature’s
implementation of reforms to education funding to ensure that the state
is complying with its duty to provide education for the children within
its borders. 424 As the Court recognized in McCleary, while it cannot
dictate “the precise means by which the State must discharge its duty,” it
also “cannot stand on the sidelines and hope the State meets its
constitutional mandate to amply fund education.” 425 Like the
constitutional mandate to fund education, the proposed amendment
would create a state mandate to provide for a healthy environment. The
proposed amendment would, like article IX, section 1, be “a mandate,
not to a single branch of government, but to the entire state.”426 A broad
mandate ensures that the courts cannot “abdicate [their] judicial role” in
ensuring that the mandate is followed. 427 A clear, codified right to a
healthy environment could also give the court reason to closely
scrutinize state action or inaction that may be imposing negative
thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine.”).
422. Id.
423. If such an amendment is adopted, Washington courts could look to other states that have a
similar constitutional provision, like Montana and Pennsylvania (discussed supra Parts I.E.1.a & c),
for guidance on how to interpret and implement an amendment guaranteeing a right to a healthy
environment. A more detailed comparison between the proposed Washington amendment and other
states’ provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
424. See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 546–47, 269 P.3d 227, 261 (2012).
425. Id. at 541, 269 P.3d at 259.
426. Id.
427. Id.
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environmental consequences. 428
A constitutional amendment could not only be a judicial hook, but
could also impose a mandate (and the authority necessary to carry it out)
on state agencies 429 and the legislature. 430 Passing a constitutional right
to a healthy environment has a huge influence on environmental
legislation. 431 In the vast majority of the countries examined by
Professor Boyd, countries with a constitutional right to a healthy
environment have strengthened national environmental laws, and
“incorporat[ed] substantive and procedural environmental rights.” 432 A
constitutionally enshrined broad public trust doctrine that clearly creates
a positive right to a healthy environment could provide the vision and
support required for the state to implement controversial environmental
protection measures. 433 With a constitutional mandate, neither the
legislature nor the courts could avoid their duty to protect the
environment. Having constitutional authority for environmental
protection is particularly important given the politically controversial
and often divisive nature of many environmental problems. 434
CONCLUSION
Amending the Washington State Constitution to include a positive
right to a healthy environment is not a radical step for Washington. It is
a necessary step to ensure the state’s environmental integrity and protect
its citizens’ health. Washington, along with the rest of the world, is
facing and will continue to face serious environmental challenges.
Although Washington cannot control nor solve all of its impending
environmental problems by itself, it must do what it can because those
problems will negatively affect the state’s citizens, economy, and natural
resources. Amending the Constitution, and empowering individuals with
a positive right to a healthy environment, is the first crucial step to
ensure that the Evergreen State remains forever green.

428. Klass, supra note 31, at 719.
429. Craig, supra note 42, at 831.
430. Cf. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
431. BOYD, supra note 261, at 279.
432. Id. at 279–80.
433. See id. at 28.
434. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 7, at 57–59 (discussing the political nature of many
environmental decisions); Juliet Eilperin, The Keystone XL Pipeline and Its Politics, Explained,
WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/04/03/thekeystone-xl-pipeline-and-its-politics-explained/ (explaining why the proposed Keystone XL
Pipeline is so politically controversial).
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Appendix A
Joint Resolution
BE IT RESOLVED, BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, IN
LEGISLATIVE SESSION ASSEMBLED:
THAT, At the next general election to be held in this state the
secretary of state shall submit to the qualified voters of the state for their
approval and ratification, or rejection, an amendment to Article I of the
Constitution of the state of Washington by adding a new section to read
as follows:
“Article I, section ___. (a) The state of Washington is the trustee of
Washington’s natural environment, including the air, water, soil, and
ocean shores. It is one of the principal duties of the state to protect,
preserve, and restore the state’s natural environment for the current
generation and for generations to come. Those residing within
Washington’s borders, now and in the future, have a positive right to live
in and enjoy a healthy environment.
(b) This amendment shall take full effect immediately upon the
approval and ratification by the qualified voters. The legislature may
take action to carry out the purposes of this section, but no such action
shall be required for this section to become effective.”
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the statement of subject and
concise description for the ballot title of this constitutional amendment
shall read: “The legislature has proposed a constitutional amendment to
enshrine a positive right to a healthy environment. The amendment
would create self-executing right to a healthy environment and establish
the protection, preservation, and restoration of Washington’s air, water,
soil, and ocean shores as a principal state duty. Should this constitutional
amendment be:
Approved
Rejected

................................
................................”

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the secretary of state shall
cause notice of this constitutional amendment to be published at least
four times during the four weeks next preceding the election in every
legal newspaper in the state.
— END —

